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ABSTRACT
This Article analyzes the doctrinal instruments federal courts use
to allocate scarce adjudicative resources over competing demands for
constitutional remedies. It advances two claims. First, a central,
hitherto underappreciated, doctrinal instrument for rationing judicial
resources is a demand that most constitutional claimants demonstrate
that an official violated an exceptionally clear, unambiguous
constitutional rule—that is, not only that the Constitution was
violated, but that the violation evinced a demanding species of fault.
This fault rule first emerged in constitutional tort jurisprudence. It has
diffused to the suppression and postconviction review contexts. The
Article’s second claim is that fault-based rationing of constitutional
remedies flows, to an underappreciated degree, from an institutional
commitment to judicial independence. Federal courts have developed
branch-level autonomy, along with distinctly institutional interests,
over the twentieth century. These interests are inconsistent with the
vindication of many individualized constitutional claims. Although

Copyright © 2015 Aziz Z. Huq.
† Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. I received terrific feedback on an
earlier draft of this paper at the University of Buffalo SUNY Law School. I am also especially
grateful to Anya Bernstein, Guyora Binder, Samuel Bray, Luis Chiesa, Zach Clompton, Jim
Gardner, Genevieve Lakier, Marin Levy, Anji Malhotra, Tony O’Rourke, Eve Primus, John
Rappaport, Mike Seidman, Neil Siegel, Matthew Steilen, and Rick Su for their generous and
illuminating responses and comments, which have saved me from many errors. Michael
Fishman, Jyoti Jindal, and other editors at the Journal did a superlative job on this piece,
providing excellent editing and substantive advice. I’m grateful for their care and patience. All
remaining errors are mine alone. I am also pleased to acknowledge the support of the Frank
Cicero, Jr. Faculty Fund.

HUQ IN PRINTER-FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

10/6/2015 11:46 AM

[Vol. 65:1

ideological preferences and changing socioeconomic conditions have
had well-recognized influences on the path of constitutional remedies,
I argue that the judiciary’s institutional preferences have also played a
large role. This causal link between judicial independence and
remedial rationing raises questions about federal courts’ function in
the Separation of Powers.
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INTRODUCTION
1

Article III adjudication is a scarce good. This is not just a
function of rising caseloads, statutory as well as constitutional,
2
outstripping federal courts’ capacity. It also flows inexorably from
the fact that settled constitutional rules are daily broken. Between the
1950s and the 1970s, the Supreme Court fashioned a thick network of
constitutional rules to bind police officers, prison officials,
3
prosecutors, state trial court judges, and frontline bureaucrats. These
rules are often observed now only in the breach. Even in the wellstructured, closely supervised context of state criminal courts, there is
4
ample evidence that constitutional rights are systemically flouted.
Some municipal justice systems may stay solvent by illegally depriving
5
citizens of basic liberties. On our nation’s streets, constitutional
6
violations are routinized in some urban neighborhoods. We simply

1. Judicial recognition of this point is frequent. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct.
2074, 2080 (2011) (“Courts should think carefully before expending scarce judicial resources to
resolve difficult and novel questions of constitutional or statutory interpretation that will have
no effect on the outcome of the case.”); see also Marin K. Levy, Judicial Attention As A Scarce
Resource: A Preliminary Defense of How Judges Allocate Time Across Cases in the Federal
Courts of Appeals, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 401, 402 & nn.1–5 (2013) (collecting statements by
judges and numerical evidence of increasing caseload pressures).
2. Between 1990 and 2012, federal district courts’ combined civil and criminal caseloads
rose by 31 percent, whereas the number of judges rose by 17.7 percent, Judicial Facts and
Figures 2012 Table 6.1: Total Civil and Criminal Cases Filed, Terminated, and Pending
(Including Transfers), U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/file/13382/download [http://perma
.cc/523X-D26T].
3. For a celebratory account, see generally MORTON J. HOROWITZ, THE WARREN
COURT AND THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE (1998).
4. See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT
DEFENDANTS, GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL
JUSTICE, at iv–v (2004), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_
indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_bp_right_to_counsel_in_criminal_proceedings.authcheckdam
.pdf [http://perma.cc/6JVP-PAZ4] (finding that many indigents still lack adequate
representation and that legal aid programs are woefully underfunded); see also Eve Brensike
Primus, A Structural Vision of Habeas Corpus, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 16–23 (2010) (cataloging
many more entrenched practices in state criminal courts that violate defendants’ constitutional
rights).
5. See, e.g., Monica Davey, Ferguson One of 2 Missouri Suburbs Sued Over Gauntlet of
Traffic Fines and Jail, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2015, at A8 (describing law suit challenging municipal
policies resulting in routine jailing of the poor). Alice Goffman’s recent ethnography of innercity Philadelphia is also replete with examples of how basic liberty rights are routinely violated
by urban criminal justice systems. See generally ALICE GOFFMAN, ON THE RUN: FUGITIVE LIFE
IN AN AMERICAN CITY (2014).
6. A 2002 Bureau of Justice national survey estimated that police used force against
individuals on 664,500 instances annually, and that approximately 587,000 of those usages were
perceived to be excessive. MATTHEW R. DUROSE ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
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have no reliable way to know how often zoning officials, welfare
bureaucrats, or prison guards act on unconstitutional grounds or
discard mandatory procedures.
So mundane and so frequent are violations of settled
constitutional rules that federal courts plainly lack capacity to offer
relief in all cases. True, federal courts need write no new law to
resolve these cases. But even if the law is clear, there are, as
Blackstone observed, “above a hundred of our lawsuits [that] arise
7
from disputed facts, for one in which the law is doubted of.” Even if
constitutional rules were wrought with crystalline transparency, the
cost of factual adjudication means that not even a fraction of
constitutional violations could be resolved in federal court. For this
reason alone, the supposedly “settled and invariable principle” of
public law, famously articulated by Chief Justice John Marshall, “that
every right, when withheld, must have a remedy, and every injury its
8
proper redress” is increasingly elusive.
Yet if some rationing of constitutional remedies is inevitable,
how is it to be done—and, as importantly, by whom? This Article
analyzes these how and who questions prompted by remedial scarcity
in constitutional law. It advances two claims. First, the Court has
developed a gatekeeping rule of fault for individualized constitutional
remedies ranging from constitutional tort to habeas to the
exclusionary rule. In a previous article, I identified in passing this
transubstantive migration, but did not comprehensively analyze its
9
evolution or effects. Building on that work here, I develop a more
extensive account of fault’s role in constitutional remediation.
Second, I contend that standard accounts of the narrowing of
10
constitutional remedies since the 1980s have omitted an important

DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CONTACTS BETWEEN POLICE AND THE PUBLIC, 2005, at 8 (2007),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpp05.pdf [http://perma.cc/6ZW8-TJDT].
7. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *330 (spelling adjusted).
8. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 147 (1803). In this passage, Chief Justice
Marshall was discussing the common-law writ system, in which such a one-to-one
correspondence between rights and remedies existed.
9. Aziz Z. Huq, Habeas and the Roberts Court, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 582 (2014)
(discussing the role of fault). A student note published later the same year also noted
commonality of approaches across remedial domains, largely to criticize rather than to explain.
See Thomas K.S. Fu, Note, Against Doctrinal Convergence in Constitutional Remedies, 10 STAN.
J. C.R. & C.L. 293, 303–04 (2014).
10. The standard accounts focus on ideological change within the Court. See, e.g., David
Rudovsky, Running in Place: The Paradox of Expanding Rights and Restricted Remedies, 2005
U. ILL. L. REV. 1199, 1239.
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factor: Judicial independence both facilitates and motivates the faultbased gatekeeping system in constitutional remedies. Of course,
factors such as judicial ideology, the politics of crime, and beliefs
about the moral worth of relevant rights-holding populations have
played a role in crafting our law of constitutional remedies. In
addition to these factors, I argue, the institutional independence of
Article III tribunals can impede the realization of constitutional
rights.
The Article’s first contribution is to show how a gatekeeping
fault rule emerged and assumed a supervisory role in titrating most
11
individualized constitutional remedies. The term “fault” is a legal
12
term of art requiring some definition. Following the Supreme Court,
I use fault in a specific, narrow sense. In this constitutional remedies
context, fault is used to pick out cases in which it was not possible for
the offender to “reasonably believe” they were acting consistent with
13
the Constitution. Identifying a mere constitutional violation is not
enough. A fault-based gatekeeping rule requires constitutional
litigants to have suffered a self-evident violation of a clear and
14
unambiguously applicable constitutional rule. The magnitude of the
legal error must be substantial.
Fault so defined is a familiar element of constitutional tort
doctrine in the form of the qualified immunity defense, and also a
15
(less noticed) dimension of municipal liability doctrine. Fault has
also spilled over into the substantive law of certain constitutional
provisions that commonly form the basis of constitutional tort actions,
such as the Due Process Clause. Less noticed still is fault’s contagious
11. See infra Part I (extending and substantiating this account).
12. Cf. Kyron Huigens, Solving the Apprendi Puzzle, 90 GEO. L.J. 387, 419–20 (2002)
(exploring the overlapping meanings of fault and culpability).
13. John C. Jeffries, Jr., Compensation for Constitutional Torts: Reflections on the
Significance of Fault, 88 MICH. L. REV. 82, 98 (1989).
14. One might reasonably protest that the Court should employ a term such as
“unreasonable fault,” but it has not done so. I shall not confuse matters by diverting from its
terminology.
15. Professor John Jeffries has written a series of important articles identifying and
defending the regulative role of fault in constitutional tort. See Jeffries, supra note 13, at 96–101;
see also John C. Jeffries, Jr., Disaggregating Constitutional Torts, 110 YALE L.J. 259, 263 (2000)
[hereinafter Jeffries, Disaggregating]; John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment
and Section 1983, 84 VA. L. REV. 47, 49 (1998); John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Liability Rule for
Constitutional Torts, 99 VA. L. REV. 207, 209 (2013) (presenting “a unified theory of
constitutional torts”); John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109
YALE L.J. 87, 98–100 (1999). Jeffries, however, has not extended the analysis beyond the
constitutional tort context as this Article seeks to do.
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spread into contiguous remedial contexts and even some substantive16
law domains. Since the late 1980s, it has come to dominate the law of
17
postconviction relief for prisoners under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Further, it
is increasingly the main gatekeeping rule for criminal defendants
seeking a suppression remedy after a Fourth or Fifth Amendment
18
violation. One consequence of fault’s ascendency within the
doctrinal framework of constitutional remedies is that the modal
question in constitutional litigation today is no longer whether the
Constitution has been violated. Rather, it is whether the violation was
sufficiently clear and self-evident to warrant expending scarce judicial
resources.
Why has this version of fault, which hinges on the violation’s
clarity at the time it occurred and which plainly favors the state,
become the organizing principle of remedial rationing? The Article’s
second contribution is a causal hypothesis: One of the important, yet
wholly overlooked, causes of the fault-based rationing system for
constitutional remedies is the institutional independence of the
19
judiciary. Leading accounts of constitutional remedies stress the role
of ideological interests and historical circumstances in shaping the
20
path of constitutional remedies. I do not revisit those claims. Rather,
I add to those accounts by focusing on the important role that the
judiciary’s institutional interests have played in shaping constitutional
remedies. I aim to show how an account of recent constitutional
doctrine without accounting for institutional interests is incomplete.
16. In charting the spillover of fault to the definition of substantive rights, I confess to
stepping beyond my remedial remit in order to illuminate the doctrine better.
17. The law of 28 U.S.C. § 2255 largely tracks that of § 2254.
18. See infra Part I.C.
19. By referring to judicial independence, I do not refer to the sense of “decisional
independence of individual judges” but in the sense of “the institutional independence of the
judiciary as a whole.” See Vicki C. Jackson, Packages of Judicial Independence: The Selection
and Tenure of Article III Judges, 95 GEO. L.J. 965, 967 (2007).
20. See, e.g., Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren
and Burger Courts’ Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J. 185, 247 (1983) (arguing that the Burger
Court favored “judicial deregulation of state and federal criminal justice officials,” and showed
“hostility to fair process norms that impair the state’s capacity to detect and punish the factually
guilty”); Alan M. Dershowitz & John Hart Ely, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious
Observations on the Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198, 1227
(1971) (noting the “[i]deological ebb and flow” in the Court’s criminal procedure
jurisprudence); Louis Michael Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court: An Examination of
Continuity and Change in Criminal Procedure, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 436, 437 (1980) (arguing that
the “Burger Court is undoubtedly more interested than its predecessor in using the criminal
process to effect broadscale crime prevention and control” but also noting that these aspects of
the Court had been overstated).
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In particular, I propose that interests in judicial economy and
prestige, in addition to ideological priorities in favor (or against)
certain litigants, play a role.
Supplementing leading accounts of constitutional remedies with
such institutional considerations is of no mere antiquarian interest. It
has contemporary ramifications. An account of remedial rationing
based on ideological factors alone implies that changing the Court’s
composition would lead to more available remedies. I predict
otherwise. Rather, even a high court with a higher proportion of
Democratic appointees would not behave all that differently. For
whatever partisan flag they try to occlude, Justices of left and right
alike have historically evinced a powerful allegiance to the
institutional concerns of the Article III courts.
The evidence I present for a causal link between judicial
independence and remedial rationing is circumstantial. As a threshold
matter, I demonstrate that the two standard reasons for explaining
remedial rationing are incomplete. First, legislative action alone
cannot explain the current doctrinal regime for redressing violations
of individual constitutional rights. In many statutory domains,
including civil rights, Congress has played a large role in creating and
21
modifying remedies. Not so with many strictly constitutional
remedies. Although Congress has influenced some remedial regimes,
its most important interventions have come too late to have causal
force, and they too often merely codified previously articulated
22
judicial preferences.
Second, ideological preferences over
constitutional rights and rights-holding populations do not explain all
doctrinal change. To a greater extent than appreciated, constitutional
remedies have been narrowed by ideologically mixed coalitions of the
Court. The poverty of both standard accounts points to the need for
alternative explanations, and opens the way for a new accounting.
I supplement standard accounts by highlighting the role of the
23
judiciary’s institutional interests. The positive case for linking

21. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1077 (1991) (“The
Congress finds that . . . additional remedies under Federal law are needed to deter unlawful
harassment and intentional discrimination in the workplace . . . .”).
22. See Huq, supra note 9, at 531 n.44; see also infra text accompanying notes 216–218.
23. For an empirical account of the judiciary’s institutional development emphasizing the
vast gains it has made in legitimacy and authority, see Kevin McGuire, The Institutionalization
of the U.S. Supreme Court, 12 POL. ANALYSIS 128, 141 (2004). For a historical account also
illustrating the steep gradient in institutional growth, see JUSTIN CROWE, BUILDING THE
JUDICIARY: LAW, COURTS, AND THE POLITICS OF INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 224 (2012).
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remedial rationing and judicial independence starts with the context
in which the doctrine changed. The gatekeeping role of fault
crystallized largely in the early 1980s. In this era, new pressures
impinged on the Article III judiciary. These pressures arose from the
contemporaneous rise of mass incarceration, which created
metastasizing demands for criminal adjudication and postconviction
24
25
review. Recent empirical work also shows that “institutional”
considerations often shape the Justices’ behavior, an influence that to
date has been largely ignored. Indeed, Justices have explicitly, if
occasionally, identified institutional interests as a motive for
26
narrowing constitutional remedies. Finally, an analysis of the
remedial contexts in which the Court has not extended the fault rule
supports the inference that institutional incentives are at work in
shaping the doctrine.
This causal vector—from the judiciary’s institutional interests to
remedial constriction—is not only missing from previous accounts,
but is roughly the inverse of one standard account in the literature,
offered by the late Professor William Stuntz. According to Stuntz, it
was the generosity of federal constitutional remediation that induced
27
legislatures to tilt toward more punitive policies. While recognizing
this account as theoretically sophisticated and parsimonious, I
28
supplement previous empirical criticisms
by arguing that
constitutional doctrine responded to—and did not cause—the
massive changes in the volume and punitiveness of American criminal
justice systems starting in the 1970s, with the judiciary’s institutional
interests playing an important mediating role.

24. See generally TODD R. CLEAR & NATASHA A. FROST, THE PUNISHMENT IMPERATIVE:
THE RISE AND FALL OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA (2014).
25. Thomas M. Keck, Party, Policy, or Duty: Why Does the Supreme Court Invalidate
Federal Statutes?, 101 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 321, 323 (2007).
26. See, e.g., Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 537 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“It must
prejudice the occasional meritorious application to be buried in a flood of worthless ones. He
who must search a haystack for a needle is likely to end up with the attitude that the needle is
not worth the search.”).
27. See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and
Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 64 (1997) [hereinafter Stuntz, Uneasy Relationship]; see also
William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 559–65
(2001) (using the void-for-vagueness doctrine as an example of this dynamic).
28. For a devastating analysis of the empirics of Stuntz’s claims, see Stephen J. Schulhofer,
Criminal Justice, Local Democracy, and Constitutional Rights, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1045, 1049–60
(2013).
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The principal aims of this Article are descriptive: the
identification and diagnosis of an immanent rationing principle
governing much constitutional remedies doctrine, and the
development of an argument, supported by several strands of
circumstantial evidence, of one important causal force. This analysis,
important on its own terms, also clears ground for normative
reevaluation of what role federal courts can play, or ought to play, in
the enforcement of settled constitutional rules. Perhaps most
importantly, it should unsettle some persistently unexamined truisms
of constitutional law. Conventional Separation of Powers
jurisprudence takes for granted that the independence of Article III
judges exists “‘not to benefit the judges,’ but ‘as a limitation imposed
in the public interest’ . . . by helping to secure an independence of
mind and spirit necessary if judges are ‘to maintain that nice
adjustment between individual rights and governmental powers which
29
constitutes political liberty.’” As recently as March 2015, members
of the Court have pronounced without contradiction that “the
‘separation of powers’ . . . [is] essential to the protection of individual
30
liberty.” This truism assumes an alignment between judicial
incentives and the vindication of “individual rights” and “political
liberty.” But Separation of Powers theory is peculiarly silent on how
that alignment might occur, or why institutional incentives would
31
necessarily conduce to the vindication of rights. This Article’s
account of remedial rationing in the shadow of judicial independence
demonstrates that judicial incentives and the interests of
constitutional-rights holders need not run together. Instead, they not
only can, but do, diverge sharply as a result of the judiciary’s

29. United States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557, 568 (2001) (citations omitted); accord Evans v.
Gore, 253 U.S. 245, 249 (1920) (“The Constitution was framed on the fundamental theory that a
larger measure of liberty and justice would be assured by vesting the three great powers, the
legislative, the executive, and the judicial, in separate departments . . . .”).
30. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1215 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(quoting Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2608–09 (2011)).
31. The failure of traditional Separation of Powers theory to specify a persuasive causal
channel for claimed effects of institutional design has been noted in other contexts. For an
application in the context of legislative/executive relations, see, for example, Daryl J. Levinson
& Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2324–25
(2006) (“[T]he political interests of elected officials generally correlate more strongly with party
than with branch . . . . [P]arty is likely to be the single best predictor of political agreement and
disagreement.”). See also Aziz Z. Huq, Libertarian Separation of Powers, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. &
LIBERTY 1006, 1012 (2014) (expressing skepticism about the necessary connection between the
functional separation of different elements of governmental power and the promotion of
liberty).
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institutional interests in prestige and docket management. These can
stand starkly at odds with the rights-holding public’s concerns. This
gap should provoke hesitation about canonical Separation of Powers
assumptions.
This Article’s analysis is limited along three dimensions. First, I
32
focus here solely on constitutional claims, not statutory claims, and
consider only courts’ power to issue relief that directly responds to a
33
constitutional wrong. Such cases merit analysis because they
34
comprise a significant slice of the federal docket. Second, my
argument concerns federal courts as axiomatic loci for the vindication
35
of federal constitutional rights. Of course, federal courts often stay
their hand to allow state courts a first effort at resolving a
36
constitutional issue, while state courts can also play a role in

32. Parallel accounts might be told in regard to other domains of public law. See, e.g., J.
Maria Glover, The Disappearing Shadow of Public Law, 125 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2015).
Moreover, it is possible that the Court acts as if it has a heightened measure of policymaking
discretion when it comes to constitutional remedies, as opposed to statutory forms with respect
to which it purports to hew to congressional will. For this reason, the area of constitutional
remedies with which I am concerned represents a particularly fertile perspective on judicial
preferences and behavior.
33. My focus on remedies means that I also do not attend to other devices for limiting the
flow of claims or reducing the costs of adjudication in this domain. One might also look at
attorney’s fees. For example, in Buckcannon Board and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia
Department of Health and Human Services, 532 U.S. 598, 605 (2001), the Court interpreted the
Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act of 1976 to permit fees awards only when a judgment,
court-approved settlement, or some other order formally changed the legal relationship
between the parties. In an equitable suit challenging an institutional practice after Buckcannon,
defendants can litigate equitable claims to the point of judgment, and then avoid fees by
consenting to the relief requested.
34. Prisoner cases, for example, take up about a fifth of the number of civil suits filed in
district courts in recent years. See U.S. District Courts – Judicial Business 2013, U.S. COURTS, at
tbl. 3, http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2013/us-district-courts.aspx [http://
perma.cc/CBV6-PZ8L].
35. Hence, this Article does not address the different ways in which structural
constitutional values might be enforced. Cf. Aziz Z. Huq, Standing for the Structural
Constitution, 99 VA. L. REV. 1435, 1499–1514 (2013) (analyzing the choice between public and
private enforcement of structural constitutional values).
36. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46–47 (1971) (limiting the availability of
pretrial federal injunctive relief against state criminal process). The role of state courts was
especially important in the early Republic. See Alfred Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69 COLUM.
L. REV. 1109, 1142 (1969) (“Despite their remedial deficiencies, it was the state courts that were
looked to [before 1875] for the vindication of constitutional rights, subject to review by the
Supreme Court.”). For an example of path-marking state-court action on constitutional rights,
see Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 1004–05 (Mass. 2003)
(recognizing a right to same-sex marriage under state constitutional law).
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37

vindicating constitutional entitlements. But even if state courts are
38
“presumed competent to resolve federal issues,” they cannot play a
comprehensive role. State courts cannot issue mandatory writs
39
against federal officials, or free a federal prisoner from unlawful
40
confinement. Further, federal courts by “consensus” play a
41
dominant role today in constitutional remediation. Enforcement of
constitutional rights by the executive branch, while important, is also
42
inconstant. Finally, this Article analyzes the remedial function of the
43
federal courts, not its distinct role in defining rights. This focus on
constitutional remedies builds upon an emerging body of scholarship
recognizing that questions of “what to do about a completed or
threatened violation of law” are “distinct from the question of
44
whether there has been or is about to be a violation.”
37. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 117 (1985) (expressing “confidence that state judges, no
less than their federal counterparts, will properly discharge their duty to protect the
constitutional rights of criminal defendants”); see also Giovanna Shay, The New State
Postconviction, 46 AKRON L. REV. 473, 475 (2013) (noting that state postconviction proceedings
“are being forced to assume a new role in the development of federal constitutional criminal
procedure”).
38. Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 150 (1988).
39. McClung v. Silliman, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 598, 605 (1821) (holding that a federal
official’s “conduct could only be controlled by the power that created him”).
40. Tarble’s Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397, 411–12 (1871); Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21
How.) 506, 524 (1859).
41. Ann Woolhandler, The Common Law Origins of Constitutionally Compelled Remedies,
107 YALE L.J. 77, 81, 111–25 (1997) (arguing that there is a “consensus that the federal courts
should administer a federalized set of rights and remedies for federal constitutional rights”).
42. The executive branch, for example, wields large authority over determinations of how
laws are enforced and defended from constitutional attack, supplying a nonjudicial forum for
rights vindication. Cf. Aziz Z. Huq, Enforcing (but not Defending) ‘Unconstitutional’ Laws, 98
VA. L. REV. 1001, 1001–02 (2012) (discussing modalities of executive enforcement of the
Constitution). A 1994 statute also vests the Department of Justice with authority to force
institutional reform in police departments. 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2012) (authorizing the Justice
Department to seek injunctive relief against departments with a pattern of unconstitutional
conduct). But § 14141’s deployment is neither uniform nor comprehensive. Even with executive
aid, the federal judiciary still provides a unique fulcrum from which rights can be leveraged.
43. For examples of scholarship that explores how courts define rights in optimal or
suboptimal ways, compare Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of
Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1215 (1978) (describing and
criticizing underenforcement of equal protection norms), with Emily Sherwin, Judges as
Rulemakers, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 919 (2006) (defending the common-law method of
generating constitutional rules).
44. Douglas Laycock, How Remedies Became A Field: A History, 27 REV. LITIG. 161, 164–
65 (2008). For work focusing on the interaction between remedial design and the substance of
constitutional rights, see, for example, Orin S. Kerr, Fourth Amendment Remedies and
Development of the Law: A Comment on Camreta v. Greene and Davis v. United States, 2011
CATO SUP. CT. REV. 237, 244–45 (considering interactions between changes in exclusionary rule
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The argument proceeds in three stages. Part I establishes the
centrality of fault in the rationing of three individualized
constitutional remedies—money-damages actions, postconviction
relief from unconstitutionally imposed criminal sentences, and the
suppression of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth or Fifth
Amendment. Part II turns to the etiology of fault’s regulative role. I
argue that the rise of fault cannot be ascribed solely to Congress or
the shifting ideological preferences of the Justices—perhaps the two
most obvious alternatives. I then offer positive evidence to support
the hypothesis that one of its underappreciated causes is judicial
independence. Part III then examines some normative consequences
of this link between judicial independence and the regulative role of
fault. In particular, I suggest that the account of remedial rationing
offered here casts doubt on some central assumptions in Separation
of Powers jurisprudence.
I. FAULT AND THE RATIONING OF CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES
This Part advances the descriptive claim that the Supreme Court
has installed a requirement of fault as a threshold gatekeeping rule
for constitutional remedies. This fault rule arose in the late 1970s and
early 1980s. It diffused from constitutional tort law to postconviction
habeas law and the rules governing the exclusionary rule as a remedy
for Fourth and Fifth Amendment violations. It has also seeped into
the substantive law in some domains. In its modal form, the faultbased gatekeeping rule observed across these domains requires that
an individual litigant must demonstrate that the relevant
constitutional violation was clear and unambiguous at the moment of
the alleged violation in order to access either trial or a remedial order.
A fault rule of this kind emerged first from constitutional tort
45
law under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and so-called Bivens suits; spread to the

doctrine and qualified immunity doctrine for the development of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence); Jennifer E. Laurin, Trawling for Herring: Lessons in Doctrinal Borrowing and
Convergence, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 670, 706 (2011) (suggesting the Court’s impetus for
“conceiving of the exclusionary rule as a remedy premised upon fault and desert” derives from
constitutional tort doctrine).
45. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
396–97 (1971). Under Bivens, the Court created a private cause of action for money damages
against federal officials in their personal capacity who violate certain constitutional rules. Bivens
involved a Fourth Amendment violation; the Court has subsequently been “circumspect” about
extending the Bivens cause of action to other contexts. James E. Pfander & David Baltmanis,
Rethinking Bivens: Legitimacy and Constitutional Adjudication, 98 GEO. L.J. 117, 118 (2009).
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exclusionary rule in Fourth and (increasingly) Fifth Amendment
contexts; and also to postconviction review of state and federal
46
convictions. I should be explicit here that this list does not cover the
waterfront of constitutional remedies. Indeed, I shall argue in Part II
that the Court has conspicuously failed to extend the fault rule to
47
other sorts of constitutional challenges. So my claim here is not that
the Court has evinced blanket skepticism or hostility to constitutional
remediation. Rather, I aim here to chart the domain in which the
Court has erected barriers to some forms of relief—domains in which
the demand for remediation is especially steep—while bracketing
consideration of why that rule has not been extended further until
Part II.
To analyze the regulative function of fault in constitutional
remedies, I begin by briefly summarizing how the remedial
mechanisms at issue evolved from, and superseded, a common-law
framework of constitutional enforcement mechanisms. Unlike
previous accounts, I underscore the migration of rationing rules from
the familiar context of qualified immunity into not just some domains
of constitutional law, but also parallel remedial mechanisms such as
48
the exclusionary rule and postconviction habeas. Moreover, unlike
previous recountings, my account deliberately underscores the fact
that fault has become central not because of legislative choice, but
rather as a consequence of unbounded judicial policy discretion. The
fact that judges, rather than policymakers in the political branches,
have been at the forefront in responding to the problem of remedial
scarcity in constitutional law is central to the causal link between
judicial independence and remedial rationing that I develop at length
in Part II.
A. The Remedial Dispensation for Individualized Constitutional
Wrongs
The current dispensation for constitutional remediation is of
relatively recent vintage. From the Republic’s founding until the early
46. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2012) (authorizing federal courts to grant habeas relief to
prisoners); id. §§ 2254, 2255 (setting forth, respectively, rules for state prisoners and federal
prisoners).
47. See infra Part II.B.
48. This is called “borrowing” by Nelson Tebbe and Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional
Borrowing, 108 MICH. L. REV. 459, 463 (2010) (defining constitutional borrowing as “an
interpretive practice characterized by a deliberate effort to bridge disparate constitutional fields
for persuasive ends”).
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twentieth century, courts enforced constitutional rules largely via
state-law tort and contract actions for damages into which federal-law
49
elements could be injected. Even the federal government could be
brought into constitutional compliance using a common-law action
50
such as ejectment. Constitutional adjudication would typically arise
in common-law contexts when a state defendant endeavored to
deflect liability in pointing to a source of official authority and the
51
plaintiff in response involved the Constitution to pierce that defense.
In these early cases, the courts’ role was limited to determining
whether the conduct in litigation was lawful and then deciding
52
whether “to award damages.” It was then up to the legislature to
53
determine whether to indemnify the defendant official.
54
This common-law system of enforcement “dwindled” over time
for several interlocking reasons. First, state-law tort actions raising
constitutional issues “by ‘imperceptible steps’ came to be seen as
55
federal causes of action” by the end of the nineteenth century.
Second, federal judges in the mid-1800s began to invoke with
increasing frequency inchoate conceptions of immunity to deflect
private suits against state actors, with the result that common-law
56
damages actions for constitutional violations “atroph[ied].” Third,
49. Sina Kian, The Path of the Constitution: The Original System of Remedies, How it
Changed, and How the Court Responded, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 132, 134 (2012) (noting that the
Constitution was originally “to be implemented through remedies available for violations of
common law rights”); Woolhandler, supra note 41, at 79–81.
50. Antonin Scalia, Sovereign Immunity and Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative
Action: Some Conclusions from the Public-Lands Cases, 68 MICH. L. REV. 867, 882–86 (1970)
(describing this practice).
51. Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 45, at 134 (noting that “for much of the nation’s
history, state common law provided victims with a right of action that . . . could eventually result
in the vindication of their constitutional rights” by treating the constitutional violation as
“invalidat[ing] any authority conferred by federal law”).
52. James E. Pfander & Jonathan L. Hunt, Public Wrongs and Private Bills:
Indemnification and Government Accountability in the Early Republic, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1862,
1868 (2010); see also Bowden v. Morris, 3 F. Cas. 1032, 1032 (C.C.E.D. Va. 1876) (No. 1,715)
(“Except in cases where property is taxed, or otherwise taken for public purposes, [government
cannot deprive a person of rights without] suit in a court of justice.”).
53. Pfander & Hunt, supra note 52, at 1867 (noting that “reimbursement of a well-founded
claim [was viewed] more as a matter of right than as a matter of legislative grace”).
54. Kian, supra note 49, at 134.
55. Woolhandler, supra note 41, at 101.
56. Ann Woolhandler, Patterns of Official Immunity and Accountability, 37 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 396, 422–29, 450–51 (1987). For example, ejectment actions against the federal
government, once common, came to seem eccentric, even impermissible. See, e.g., Malone v.
Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643, 648 (1962) (disallowing ejectment action against federal officer to
recover real property in the absence of a claim that the officer’s conduct violated the
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the post–Civil War economic boom led to a wave of regulation that in
turn fed demand for property-right-like protections against
unconstitutional state action that could not be satisfied via the
57
traditional common-law forms. Finally, the common-law writ system
itself fell into desuetude as simplified pleading, embodied in the 1934
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, came to dominate judicial
58
practice.
To fill the gap left by common-law actions, federal courts drew
upon statutory causes of action and innovated to create new remedial
pathways. This Part focuses on three remedial pathways, all of special
relevance for vindicating individuals’ constitutional rights against
routine unconstitutional actions by line police officers, prosecutors,
and bureaucrats. These three mechanisms are constitutional tort
actions, postconviction habeas actions, and motions for the exclusion
of unconstitutionally secured evidence in the course of a criminal
investigation.
These remedies have important commonalities. Each targets a
discrete official action usually focused on a particular individual, not a
policy or statutory command, and seeks an individualized remedy
(e.g., money, evidentiary suppression, or release). Each has roots in
the late nineteenth century or early twentieth century, quickly fell
59
into desuetude, and then did not see vigorous usage until the 1960s.
Together, they comprised the remedial side of the Warren Court’s
aggressive campaign to install the Bill of Rights and rein in states’ and
localities’ police, prosecutors, prison officials, and petty bureaucrats.
The Court’s reconstruction of constitutional remedies had three
prongs. First, the Court fashioned two constitutional tort remedies for
use against state and federal actors. In 1961 the Court in Monroe v.

Constitution); Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 687–88 (1949)
(barring claim against federal officer to enjoin breach of contract).
57. Woolhandler, supra note 56, at 452 (“[T]he change in the types of property that
increasingly became the subject of government regulation may have been partly responsible for
the modern dichotomy between damages and injunctive relief.”).
58. See Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2072 (2012)); Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 913 (1987) (exploring “the
revolutionary character of the decision inherent in the Federal Rules to make equity procedure
available for all cases”).
59. Walter E. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L.
REV. 1532, 1533 (1972) (commenting almost contemporaneously on the expansion in remedial
resources in the individual rights context in this era).
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60

Pape revived a civil-damages remedy created by the Reconstruction61
era Ku Klux Klan Act. The provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, allowed for
money-damages actions against state actors that violated the
62
Constitution. Until this date, § 1983 had not been an effectual
response to unconstitutional state action because courts had required
that plaintiffs show state-law authorization for an alleged
63
unconstitutional act. One study of § 1983’s first sixty-five years of
enactment found only nineteen instances of the statute resulting in a
64
reported decision. When courts did consider its effect, federal judges
65
typically failed to impose any effectual remedial consequences.
After Monroe had reinterpreted § 1983 to reach both authorized and
unauthorized actions of state officials the discrete, discretionary, and
dispersed actions of state and municipal frontline officials became
plausible subjects of judicial review for constitutional compliance. In
the forty years after Monroe, the volume of constitutional damages
actions filed pursuant to § 1983 increased by two orders of
66
magnitude. That growth was abetted by the Court’s 1978 decision to
expand government tort liability by permitting suits against
municipalities where “the action is alleged to be unconstitutional
67
implements or executes” a law or policy.
Supplementing the Court’s novel regulation of frontline state
officials was a new willingness to review the constitutionality of
discretionary decisions by federal officials interacting with citizens.
Congress had enacted no civil action for constitutional torts actions
against federal officials parallel to § 1983. Nevertheless, the Court in
1971 inferred a damage remedy directly from the Constitution in
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of

60. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
61. Ku Klux Klan Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (2012)).
62. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 172.
63. Id. (rejecting the then-dominant position that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 allowed suit only when
the alleged constitutional violation was authorized by state law).
64. Note, Limiting the Section 1983 Action in the Wake of Monroe v. Pape, 82 HARV. L.
REV. 1486, 1486 n.4 (1969).
65. See, e.g., Hemsley v. Myers, 45 F. 283, 290 (C.C.D. Kan. 1891) (describing statute as
purely “declaratory,” creating no new rights or modes of proceeding).
66. Rudovsky, supra note 10, at 1208 (noting that the number of non-prisoner civil-rights
suits increased from 150 in 1961 to 42,354 in 1998).
67. Monell v. N.Y. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978) (ruling on a policy that
compelled pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves of absence).
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68

Narcotics. Notably, Bivens concerned the Fourth Amendment rights
69
of a putative drug dealer during an FBI raid on his home —the same
kind of routine, hard-to-observe official exercise of discretion that
§ 1983 also distinctly addressed. Although the Supreme Court evinces
persistent leeriness of expanding the availability of damages actions
70
against federal officials in new contexts, the Bivens remedy remains
a hardy perennial in the lower courts. Recent empirical work suggests
71
Bivens actions succeed between 17–34 percent of the time. Section
1983 and Bivens actions thus provide foundations for a robust body of
constitutional torts jurisprudence.
The second expansion of constitutional remedies also occurred in
72
1961, when the Court in Mapp v. Ohio expanded the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule remedy which had, until then, only
73
availed defendants in federal courts to also cover prosecutions in
74
state courts. Then, as now, it was state officials, not federal officials,
who were tasked with the lion’s share of policing. Incorporation of
the exclusionary rule meant that that Court’s 1949 incorporation of
75
Fourth Amendment rights in Wolf v. Colorado had practical effect
76
where previously it has been, in effect, a dead letter. Five years after
imposing the exclusionary rule against the states in the Fourth
Amendment context, the Court extended the exclusionary rule to the

68. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396–
97 (1971) (recognizing cause of action for damages under Fourth Amendment).
69. For details about Webster Bivens and the search challenged in that case, see James E.
Pfander, The Story of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, in FEDERAL COURTS STORIES 275, 275–77 (Vicki C. Jackson & Judith Resnik eds.,
2009).
70. See Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 45, at 118 (noting that the Court “has grown a
good deal more circumspect” in extending Bivens to new doctrinal contexts).
71. Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation and Its Consequences
for the Individual Liability Model, 62 STAN. L. REV. 809, 842–46 (2010).
72. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
73. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 389 (1914) (unanimously applying the
exclusionary rule in federal prosecutions).
74. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 651 (describing the exclusionary rule as “part and parcel” of the
Fourth Amendment). The Court has subsequently repudiated this account of the exclusionary
rule. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
75. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
76. Id. at 28 (incorporating the Fourth Amendment against the states). In Irvine v.
California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954), in which the U.S. Supreme Court itself explicitly recommended
a federal prosecution for criminal trespass against local officials who had violated the
incorporated Fourth Amendment, no remedy was to be had. There was no investigation. The
Department failed even to open a file on the matter. Morgan Cloud, Rights Without Remedies:
The Court That Cried “Wolf,” 77 MISS. L.J. 467, 492–97 (2007) (discussing Irvine).
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Fifth Amendment’s prohibition against coerced testimony. In
77
Miranda v. Arizona, the Court installed a prophylactic regime of
oral warnings in the police-interrogation context with enforcement
78
again flowing through an exclusionary rule.
Exclusionary rules in these contexts do not, strictly speaking,
remedy the privacy, dignity, and security harms that the relevant
constitutional provisions seek to prevent, but rather have been
79
explained as vehicles for deterrence. To that extent, my terminology
of “remedies” is imprecise. Nevertheless, not all remedies place
litigants precisely in the position they would have been in absent a
80
wrong occurring. Exclusion is fairly ranked as a remedy to the extent
it is sought by a putatively injured party, and purports to eliminate an
advantage that the state as counterparty possesses as a consequence
of the constitutional wrong.
Finally—and
roughly
contemporaneously
with
these
developments in constitutional tort law and the exclusionary rule—
the midcentury Court also breathed new life into the writ of habeas
corpus as a postconviction remedy for constitutional criminal
procedure violations. For almost the first century of the Republic, the
81
habeas writ was not available as a postconviction remedy. It was
employed on rare occasions as a preemptive shield against criminal
82
prosecution. Only in 1867 did Congress expand the writ to
83
encompass review of state convictions. The 1867 statute, though, was
not followed by a expansion in habeas challenges. It was not until a
84
series of four decisions starting in 1953 with Brown v. Allen that
85
procedural constraints on habeas review withered. In the following

77. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
78. Id. at 447–48.
79. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV.
757, 796 (1994).
80. Consider the persistent refusal of courts to give unforeseeable consequential damages
for contract violations. See Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Exch. Ct.).
81. Cf. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81–82 (not extending habeas to
postconviction review).
82. See, e.g., Ex Parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 95 (1807).
83. Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385, 385–86.
84. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
85. NANCY J. KING & JOSEPH L. HOFFMANN, HABEAS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY: USES, ABUSES, AND THE FUTURE OF THE GREAT WRIT 56–57 (2011) (describing
causes and size of shift in postconviction habeas filings).
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four decades, the volume of habeas litigation lodged by state
86
prisoners engorged even more dramatically than § 1983 filings.
It is important to reiterate here that the three remedies identified
here do not cover the waterfront of potential judicial mechanisms for
enforcing the Constitution. Indeed, an important element of Part II’s
argument will focus on how exceptions to the fault rule create
incentives over the kind of constitutional suits litigants file. To
anticipate that discussion, it is worth noting here the two most
important alternatives to damages—exclusion and habeas relief—are
vehicles for individuals to secure some judicial response for a
constitutional wrong.
87
First, at least since the 1907 decision in Ex Parte Young, federal
courts have issued injunctions against state officials barring them
from civil or criminal enforcement of a state law when enforcement
88
will violate the constitutional rights of the plaintiff. Today, plaintiffs
invoking Young can allege an ongoing violation of federal law and
89
obtain prospective relief without regard to state sovereign immunity.
Second, in 1934, Congress enacted the federal Declaratory Judgment
90
Act, pursuant to which plaintiffs could secure relief against state
91
actors even when an injunction could not be obtained. Injunctive or
86. Id. at 60. The rise in habeas filings is likely a consequence of the dramatic expansion in
incarceration that characterizes federal and state criminal justice policy since the beginning of
the 1970s. See generally BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 12–15
(2006). The rise of mass incarceration also led to a sharp rise in the volume of prisoner
litigation. Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1578–87 (2003)
(documenting evidence).
87. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
88. The pivotal case is Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 148 (authorizing injunction against
unconstitutional state action absent specific statutory authorization for that remedy), but federal
courts issued injunctions against unconstitutional state action long before Young. See Edwin M.
Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 19 n.70 (1924) (collecting cases dating
from 1838).
89. Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 131 S. Ct. 1632, 1639 (2011); accord
Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002). Congress, however,
can foreclose a Young injunctive remedy by enacting a sufficiently specific statutory scheme.
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 73–76 (1996). Further, Young cannot be used to
obtain funds from a state’s treasury, or order specific performance of a State’s contract. See
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 666 (1974) (recognizing that Young does not allow relief
against a state officer); In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 502 (1887) (“A bill in equity for the specific
performance of the contract against the state by name, it is admitted could not be brought.”).
90. Act of June 14, 1934, ch. 512, 48 Stat. 955.
91. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459 (1974) (holding that declaratory relief was
available even though the threatened state criminal prosecution could not be enjoined). For an
argument that the gap between injunctive and declaratory relief is elusive, see Samuel L. Bray,
The Myth of the Mild Declaratory Judgment, 63 DUKE L.J. 1091, 1095 (2014).
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declaratory relief is of limited utility in many instances. When a
constitutional violation is inflicted without prior notice, and where the
damage is immediately realized—as is often the case when police,
prosecutors, and bureaucrats are concerned—then neither an
injunction nor a declaratory judgment will be of great use. In such
cases, the vindication of individual constitutional rights will generally
hinge on whether an individual litigant can avail themselves of a
constitutional tort action, a suppression motion, or a postconviction
remedy. Absent these tools, a constitutional violation will have no
legal or practical consequence.
B. Fault in Constitutional Tort Law
But when do plaintiffs have access to remedies such as damages,
suppression, or habeas relief? Since the mid-1970s, the Court has
rationed the availability of each of these three remedies by installing
a threshold requirement that individual rights claimants must
typically demonstrate that an offending state official not only violated
the Constitution, but did so in an especially flagrant and obvious way.
That is, it is often no longer sufficient to allege a violation of the
Constitution. It is also necessary to allege that the violation of the
Constitution was especially clear and unambiguous so as to warrant
the expense of trial and the imposition of liability. The Court has
92
framed this threshold requirement as one of “fault” or “culpability.”
Although the latter term can be used to mark out the distinctive
93
aspect of conduct warranting criminal, but not civil penalties, I
nonetheless follow the Court’s usage of the imprecise term “fault.”
To emphasize, I use that term solely to identify conduct in which the
constitutional violation is unambiguously clear ex ante, and not to
gesture toward an inchoate notion of moral blameworthiness. That is,
the term fault in this context does not pick out any facts about the
94
defendant’s state of mind.

92. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404–05 (1997) (using the terms “fault”
and “culpability” almost interchangeably); see also City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 392
(1989) (requiring “deliberate indifference” to constitutional rights).
93. Issachar Rosen-Zvi & Talia Fisher, Overcoming Procedural Boundaries, 94 VA. L.
REV. 79, 94 (2008) (noting that “moral culpability” characterizes criminal conduct, but not
conduct to which civil penalties attach).
94. The Court, that is, could plausibly (and with some gain in accuracy) have used a term
such as “unreasonable fault,” but it did not, and to innovate in terminology here would be
confusing.
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The move toward fault is clearest in the constitutional tort
context, and it is there I start. Within this doctrinal domain, fault is a
familiar element of qualified immunity doctrine, but it also plays a
central regulative role in municipal liability doctrine, and even in the
substantive law defining some of the constitutional torts most
commonly enforced through § 1983 and Bivens actions. But
conventional accounts of this doctrine miss two points that I stress in
the following account of qualified immunity and cognate fault rules in
constitutional tort law. First, the fault role stands on no legislative
foundation, but is rather a function of relatively freewheeling judicial
policymaking discretion. Second, although notionally explained as a
way of making officials’ tasks easier, the fault rule in constitutional
tort serves also to mitigate pressure upon judicial effort and
resources.
1. Fault as the Operative Principle of Qualified Immunity. No
federal statute creates immunity from tort liability in officer suits
pursuant to § 1983 or Bivens. Rather, official immunity is the Justices’
creation. This is most clearly evident in the incremental fashion it has
emerged, a pathway that bears the clear fingerprints of conscious
95
judicial policymaking, rather than any fidelity to legislative intent.
Initially, qualified immunity was modest in theory and effect. The
96
Court in the 1967 case of Pierson v. Ray first granted immunity to
officers acting pursuant to a state statute later held unconstitutional
on the ground that such immunity was a “settled principle of law”
that Congress had not meant to abolish when enacting the Ku Klux
97
Klan Act. Both Pierson’s holding and its reasoning were
circumscribed. First, only official actions taken “in good faith,” and,
with respect to police, on the basis of “probable cause” secured an
98
exception from liability. That is, the ex ante existence of some
positive legal authority for an official act seemed key to immunity.
Second, the Court recognized only such immunity as existed at
common law, and then only because it presumed that Congress did

95. See Alan K. Chen, The Facts About Qualified Immunity, 55 EMORY L.J. 229, 233–61
(2006) (providing a chronological account of the development of immunity doctrines).
96. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
97. Id. at 553–54 (noting that “Congress would have specifically so provided had it wished
to abolish” qualified immunity for police officers); accord Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367,
379 (1951).
98. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 555.
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not lightly unsettle “solidly established” common-law principles.
Legislative intent, therefore, was the touchstone of Pierson’s analysis.
100
In 1975, the Court in Wood v. Strickland began to modify the
theoretical foundations, if not the scope, of immunity. Such immunity,
explained the Wood Court, applied so long as officers act in good
faith without malicious intent, and neither reasonably know, nor
101
reasonably should have known, of its illegality. Wood did not move
far from Pierson’s focus on the existence of positive legal authority.
Yet rather than locating its immunity rule in the common law, the
Court looked directly to “strong public-policy” considerations for its
102
justification. In particular, the Wood Court conjured the concern
that “even the most conscientious . . . decisionmaker [would be
deterred] from exercising his judgment independently, forcefully, and
in a manner best serving the long-term interest of the [state] school
103
and the students.”
Subsequent immunity opinions acknowledged Pierson’s
foundation in background tort rules defeasible only by clear
104
congressional statement.
But the Court’s later expansions of
qualified immunity rapidly came unmoored from Pierson’s historical
anchorage. The doctrine instead gained momentum from the express
invocation of policy considerations. The result was a shift in
immunity’s breadth: Where Pierson intimated that immunity availed
if the official could point to the existence of a positive source of
plausible authority for a challenged act, later cases took as a
touchstone the absence of a prohibitory source of law. This pivot
dramatically engorged immunity’s reach, albeit without any clear
normative justification from the Court.
Seven years later, the Court invoked the same deterrence-related
policy concern, but in so doing expanded the substantive reach of
105
qualified immunity. In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, the Court invoked
99. Id. at 553–54.
100. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
101. See id. at 322.
102. Id. at 318; Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506–07 (1978) (relying on “considerations
of public policy” to delimit qualified immunity). For an earlier recognition of the public policy
foundations of qualified immunity doctrine, see Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498 (1896).
103. Wood, 420 U.S. at 319–21 (“[T]here must be a degree of immunity if the work of the
[state institution] is to go forward . . . .”).
104. Hence, the Court has relied on common-law principles to extend absolute immunity to
prosecutors, see Imbler v. Pachtman 424 U.S. 409, 419 (1976), and also to permit punitive
damages, see Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 34 (1983).
105. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
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again deterrence-related public policy considerations, but abandoned
106
Wood’s subjective good-faith requirement. The Harlow Court
instead shielded officials from liability unless their conduct “violate[d]
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
107
reasonable person would have known.” That is, immunity would
attach in the absence of a clear prohibition—rather than (as in
Pierson) in the presence of a clear authorization. In a subsequent
case, the Court further refined the Harlow test by insisting that it
would be applied to allegations in the most “particularized” sense
possible, that is, that the illegality of an alleged constitutional
108
violation must be starkly “apparent” to the defendant. Today, the
Court characterizes qualified immunity as protecting “all but the
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law,” and not
merely those who (as in Pierson) reasonably rely on the
109
constitutionality of a prior statutory enactment. As far as money
damages are concerned, the Constitution is a hazard only for the
110
blunderer and the fool.
In comparison to its antecedent in Pierson, the current iteration
of qualified immunity has two important qualities. First, since Wood,
the Court has made no pretense of mining the common law or
legislative intent for direction, but has engaged in naked
policymaking. The demand for particularity, for example, is grounded
solely on first-order consequentialist analysis of tort’s feedback effect
111
on official action.
Second, notwithstanding the pragmatic
foundation of the doctrine, the proffered justifications for qualified
immunity do not well explain its actual scope. The Court has
repeatedly expressed alarm about tort’s potential chilling effect on
106. Id. at 818.
107. Id.; see also Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 565 (1978) (anticipating the rule in
Harlow).
108. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987); accord Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct.
2012, 2023 (2014). The effect of qualified immunity will therefore be greatest when the Court
relies on standards rather than rules. Application of the former rarely requires a new rule,
United States v. Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1107–08 (2013), in a way that would satisfy Anderson’s
particularity requirement.
109. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2085 (2011) (quoting Malloy v. Riggs, 475 U.S. 335,
341 (1985)).
110. Sounding an even more alarmist note, Chen argues that the Court has conflated
qualified immunity with absolute immunity. Chen, supra note 95, at 275.
111. See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 643 (“An immunity that has as many variants as there are
modes of official action and types of rights would not give conscientious officials that assurance
of protection that it is the object of the doctrine to provide.”). The Anderson Court does not cite
or discuss any common-law antecedents for its rule.
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official action. But the Court has never explained how that
overdeterrence rationale motivates the move from Pierson’s demand
for positive law to Harlow’s search for a clear prohibition. Worse, the
Court has never offered any empirical evidence that overdeterrence is
in fact a problem. Recent empirical work on indemnification of tort
actions in the policing context confirms that, at least in that context,
113
indemnification is “virtually always” available, even when the
officer in question has violated both the Constitution and relevant
114
criminal law. Indeed, many jurisdictions do not even have a
mechanism to transmit information gained through lawsuits to police
115
departments that employ serial rights offenders. Although this data
has only become available recently, earlier studies reached
116
substantially parallel results. Both recent and older studies hence
suggest that it has never been the case that individual officials are
likely to pay from their own pockets. This means not only that the
Court’s overdeterrence argument based on the direct effect of money
117
damages is not persuasive as a matter of fact. It also means that the
central element of the qualified immunity edifice was one asserted
without foundation by the government, and accepted on the basis of
mere governmental ipse dixit by the Court. The Court has built a
comprehensive, transubstantive doctrinal framework for limiting
constitutional remedies without ever asking whether its basic
empirical predicate held true.

112. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
113. Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 890 (2014)
(“Between 2006 and 2011, in forty-four of the country’s largest jurisdictions, officers financially
contributed to settlements and judgments in just .41% of the approximately 9,225 civil rights
damages actions resolved in plaintiffs’ favor, and their contributions amounted to just .02% of
the over $730 million spent by cities, counties, and states in these cases.”).
114. Id. at 923–95.
115. See Joanna C. Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics of Deterrence: The Role of Lawsuits in
Law Enforcement Decisionmaking, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1023, 1028–30 (2010) (finding that law
enforcement agencies rarely gather and analyze information from lawsuits brought against them
and their officers).
116. See, e.g., Lant B. Davis et al., Project, Suing the Police in Federal Court, 88 YALE L.J.
781, 810–12 (1979) (reporting government defense and indemnification of police officers in
Connecticut); Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional Tort
Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 641, 686 (1987) (finding no cases in which “an individual official
had borne the cost of an adverse constitutional tort judgment”).
117. Qualified immunity might be defended based on officials’ risk aversion arising from the
prospect of adverse career consequences, selection effects, and the distribution of political costs.
Jeffries, Disaggregating, supra note 15, at 267–68. But even advocates of these arguments
concede that they rest on “fundamentally speculative” empirical grounds. Id. at 268.
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Even if the reason the Court gives for its currently robust
iteration of qualified immunity fails, there is an obvious alternative.
Qualified immunity is “an immunity from suit rather than a mere
118
defense to liability.” It is designed to “permit the defeat of
119
insubstantial claims without resort to trial.” So powerful is this
preference for pretrial resolution of constitutional tort claims that the
Court has crafted a textual exception to the general prohibition on
120
interlocutory appeals when qualified immunity is denied. Qualified
immunity therefore does not merely economize on the litigation
expenses of public officials, it also rations out judicial resources with
121
increasing care.
And whereas the overdeterrence-related
justification for qualified immunity rests on elusive, and perhaps false,
empirical supposition, the judicial-economy justification for qualified
immunity is both immediately clear and obviously true.
2. Fault’s Spillovers from Constitutional Tort Doctrine. The fault
rule embedded in today’s qualified immunity law has leaked from its
original locus in constitutional tort doctrine into three contexts where
the Court’s overdeterrence concern plainly does not apply. These
spillovers further undermine the conclusion that deterrence concerns
explain the domain of tort-related fault.
First, at least formally, the protections of qualified immunity do
122
not apply to tort actions against municipalities. Nevertheless,
current doctrine requires a showing that a municipal defendant not
only violated a constitutional rule, but affirmatively chose to ignore a
clear constitutional prohibition. In Board of County Commissioners v.
123
Brown, the Court stated, without explanation or elaboration, that
“rigorous standards of culpability and causation must be applied to
124
municipal liability cases.” This demand has had the greatest
practical force in cases alleging municipal liability based on improper
118. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S.
511, 526 (1985)).
119. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819 (1982); accord Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S.
299, 305–06 (1996).
120. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985) (extending government officers a right
to interlocutory appellate review of decisions that reject a qualified immunity defense).
121. It is worth noting that the Court has not required state courts to follow Mitchell’s
exception from the rule against interlocutory appeals. See Johnson v. Frankell, 520 U.S. 911, 913
(1997).
122. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 624–25 (1980).
123. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 390 (1997).
124. Id. at 397 (emphasis added).
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training or supervision. Such liability can be established only by
showing a constitutional deficiency was “so obvious, and the
inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights”
125
that policymakers could be said to be “deliberately indifferent.”
That is, it extended the fault role (understood once more not as a
demand for blameworthiness but rather a gross form of constitutional
error) to facilitate threshold dismissal.
For example, rejecting a recent suit challenging repeated
prosecutorial misconduct in New Orleans, the Court set aside a jury
finding of liability because the plaintiff had failed to show
“[p]olicymakers’ continued adherence to an approach that they know
or should know has failed to prevent tortious conduct,”
notwithstanding a string of cases in which state courts had reversed
126
convictions based on the state’s misconduct. As the dissent noted,
the trial record in that case evinced “the conceded, long-concealed
127
prosecutorial transgressions were neither isolated nor atypical.” In
practice, this ruling means that moving a municipal liability claim
from the pretrial stage to plenary courtroom proceeding requires
strong threshold evidence of a persistent pattern of unconstitutional
conduct amounting to intentional violation of the Constitution—
evidence that, in the majority of cases, will in practice be unavailable
to most plaintiffs without discovery.
Notwithstanding its rigorous enforcement of the fault rule in the
municipal liability context, the Court has not explained why there is a
need to avoid overdeterrence in such cases. Unlike individual
officials, municipalities are comparatively well placed to internalize
both the costs and benefits of constitutional violations, and thus not
128
err on the side of excessive precaution. The current doctrine’s
structure, by contrast, means that municipal entities will
systematically fail to internalize the costs of unconstitutional actions.
At the very least, there is some reason to think that municipal liability

125. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989); see also St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485
U.S. 112, 124–27 (1988) (establishing a narrow definition of official policymakers for § 1983
purposes).
126. Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1360 (2011).
127. Id. at 1370 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
128. Peter Schuck has argued that qualified immunity is warranted because officials do not
internalize the upside gains from legally risky actions, and hence should not be required to
internalize their costs in order to avoid asymmetries in their incentive structures. PETER H.
SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS 59–81 (1983); see
also Jeffries, Disaggregating, supra note 15, at 265–70.

HUQ IN PRINTER-FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

10/6/2015 11:46 AM

RATIONING CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES

27

should be more expansively available than individual officer liability
129
if the focal concern is overdeterrence. The Court, in short, has not
even tried to explain—and may not be able to explain—its extension
of fault from the individual to the municipal liability context based on
deterrence concerns. That extension, though, may alternatively fit an
account pivoted on the need to titrate carefully judicial resources in a
world where municipalities persistently violate the Constitution.
Second, the Court has extended the fault rule from qualified
immunity to challenges to unconstitutional taxes. Ex post remedies
for an invalid tax are available only when “legislators would have
good reason to suppose that enactment of the . . . tax would . . .
130
violate their oath to uphold the United States Constitution.”
However this opaque judicial gloss is understood, a “good reason”
standard extends the fault-based framework familiar from qualified
immunity to a tax context in which concerns about overdeterrence are
weak. Legislators responsible for taxation have staff, including
lawyers, capable of sophisticated legal and constitutional analysis. It
might be thought that doctrinal rules should incentivize a high degree
of care among such legislators, rather than subsidizing carelessness.
Moreover, in practice, this standard means states can throw up
impediments that complicate challenges to unconstitutional taxes,
131
often rendering many such challenges futile. If the justification for a
fault-based safe harbor is the husbanding of judicial resources, by
contrast, this extension of qualified immunity may seem more
sensible.
Third, starting in the early 1980s, the Court has fashioned a set of
rules to limit constitutional tort actions for state deprivations of
liberty and property interests in the absence of intentional or systemic
132
state actions. In 1981, the Court imposed an exhaustion rule for tort
suits based on a state official’s discretionary act depriving a person of
property—a charge most common in the policing and incarceration
129. For a development of this point, see Jack M. Beermann, Municipal Responsibility for
Constitutional Torts, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 627, 646 (1999).
130. Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 182 (1990) (plurality opinion) (O’Connor,
J.).
131. See Amy Silverstein, The Rewards and Frustrations of Successful Constitutional
Challenges to State Taxes, 87 J. TAX’N 102, 102 (1997) (noting that “success on the merits does
not always result in a refund of the unconstitutional taxes,” and listing a variety of grounds upon
which refunds have been denied).
132. For a summary of this jurisprudence, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions
About Due Process, Judicial Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 345–
52 (1993).
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contexts. In the 1986 Daniels v. Williams decision, for example,
the Court held that merely negligent acts do not amount to a
135
deprivation under the Due Process Clause. Like qualified immunity
doctrine, Daniels and its progeny require an allegation that a
defendant official has traduced an especially obvious and
unambiguous constitutional rule to move past a threshold motion to
dismiss to get to trial and potential liability. Mere negligence that
extinguishes a life or destroys property yields no cause for
136
remediation. That rule, though, applies only to “random and
unauthorized” deprivations of liberty or property, which cannot be
challenged until state remedies have been exhausted, but not in
challenges to systematic policies that result in constitutional
137
deprivations. That is, they apply precisely when the volume of suits
demanding relief is likely to be greatest.
This is also one of the rare instances in which one need not guess
at the Court’s attention to its own institutional concerns. They are
explicit on the surface of its opinions. The Court has repeatedly
announced that § 1983 should not become a “font of tort law to be
superimposed upon whatever systems may already be administered
138
by the States.” The concern with federal caseload management—
even at the cost of allowing a tranche of constitutional violations to

133. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543–44 (1981) (holding that no due process deprivation
has occurred if the state provides adequate postdeprivation process to remedy random,
unauthorized acts of state officers), overruled in part by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327
(1986); see also Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) (extending Parratt’s exhaustion
principle to intentional torts).
134. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
135. Id. at 329–30.
136. See Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 848–49 (1998) (“We have accordingly
rejected the lowest common denominator of customary tort liability as any mark of sufficiently
shocking conduct, and have held that the Constitution does not guarantee due care on the part
of state officials; liability for negligently inflicted harm is categorically beneath the threshold of
constitutional due process.”). In practice, this means that rights holders, especially in
comprehensively regulated environments (such as prisons, public housing, and the like) will
have no federal remedy for a constitutional violation unless they can point to intent. Given the
pervasive asymmetries in power and information between the public and the state in these
contexts, it will often be the case that potential plaintiffs will have no intent evidence.
137. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 137–38 (1990) (holding that Parratt does not
apply when the deprivation was foreseeable and authorized—as distinct from random and
unauthorized—and when predeprivation process would have been feasible); see also Logan v.
Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 436–37 (1982) (holding that postdeprivation remedies do
not satisfy due process where deprivation is caused by established state procedures).
138. See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976); Fallon, supra note 132, at 339 (noting
and discussing repeated invocation of this concern).
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pass without any effectual remedy, at least from a federal court—is
visible on the surface. Moreover, it is presented without any effort to
explain why the class of plaintiffs thereby deprived of a remedy are
otherwise undeserving. Fault’s penumbral extensions in the
constitutional tort context to municipal liability suits, challenges to
unconstitutional state taxes, and random, unauthorized liberty or
property deprivations therefore are not well explained by the motives
evinced in Harlow and subsequent qualified immunity cases.
C. Fault and the Exclusionary Rule
Fault has also leaked from the constitutional tort context to the
exclusionary rule context in the Fourth Amendment context and,
increasingly, in the Fifth Amendment context. The trajectory of fault
as a threshold constraint on suppression remedy evinces several
commonalities with analogous doctrine in the constitutional tort
context. First, while initially glossed as a remedy for overdeterrence,
its applications quickly outpaced that justification. Second, it too has
leaked into the substance of the Fourth Amendment. Finally, there is
some threshold circumstantial evidence that judicial interests, rather
than officials’ interests, better explain the doctrine’s development.
Unlike the issuance of damages pursuant to § 1983, the exercise
of judicial power that comprises the exclusionary rule lacks a clear
statutory foundation. Moreover, since 1974, when the Court
characterized it as a discretionary mode of Fourth Amendment
139
enforcement, its constitutional basis has been at least contestable.
For a decade thereafter, the Mapp rule nevertheless endured roughly
unscathed. Its doctrinal retrenchment began not at a litigant’s behest,
but at the Court’s. It was the Court that sua sponte ordered
140
reargument in 1983 in Illinois v. Gates to determine whether Mapp
should be modified “not to require the exclusion of evidence obtained
in the reasonable belief that the search and seizure at issue was
141
consistent with the Fourth Amendment.” Although the Court did
not reach this issue in Gates, Justice White’s concurrence invoked the
recently decided Harlow v. Fitzgerald opinion as a guide to narrowing

139. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (describing the exclusionary
rule as a judicially created remedy).
140. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
141. Petitioner’s Brief on Reargument at i, Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (No. 81-430), 1983 WL
482675 (citations omitted).
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Mapp. Beyond touting the benefits of a fault-based safe harbor for
effective law enforcement, Justice White also drew attention to the
rule’s payoff to the judiciary in terms of a “reduction in the number of
cases which will require elongated considerations of the probable
143
cause question.” Concerns of judicial economy, in short, were in
plain view even before the fault rule was installed into the structure of
exclusionary rule jurisprudence.
A year later, Justice White would write for the Court in United
144
States v. Leon and fashion a “good-faith” exception for searches in
145
reliance upon warrants not supported by probable cause. The Leon
Court once more cited qualified immunity precedent, intimating
thereby that the exclusionary rule would not apply absent intentional
146
or recklessly negligent action. Consistent with these citations, Leon
then deployed the concern with excess deterrence familiar from
Harlow, asserting that a magistrate who issued a warrant based on an
erroneous probable-cause determination lacked any “stake in the
outcome of particular criminal prosecutions” and consequently would
147
not be affected by subsequent suppression. Completing the circle,
Justice Stevens would later observe that the Leon standard would in
turn influence the Court’s approach to the level of specificity at which
148
a qualified immunity analysis would be pitched.
The Leon exception was at first limited to cases in which the
issuing magistrate had erred, and an officer had reasonably relied on
her decision. Subsequent cases extended Leon to cases where police
149
officers errantly relied on subsequently invalidated criminal statutes
150
or later-overruled Supreme Court precedent, and also where a
142. Gates, 462 U.S. at 266–67 (White, J., concurring).
143. Id. at 267.
144. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
145. Id. at 920–22.
146. See id. at 922 & n.23 (stating that “the officer’s reliance on the magistrate’s probablecause determination and on the technical sufficiency of the warrant he issues must be
objectively reasonable”); see also Laurin, supra note 44, at 703–04 (discussing doctrinal
migration in Leon).
147. Leon, 468 U.S. at 917 (“Judges and magistrates are not adjuncts to the law enforcement
team; as neutral judicial officers, they have no stake in the outcome of particular criminal
prosecutions. The threat of exclusion thus cannot be expected significantly to deter them.”); see
also Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1246–47 (2012) (exploring Leon’s deterrencebased logic).
148. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 659 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting the
migration of Leon’s “double standard” to the qualified immunity context).
149. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349–50 (1987).
150. Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2428–29 (2011).
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warrant was issued as a result of errors by a court administrator or
152
an administrator within the police department itself. In recent cases,
the Court has come close to generalizing Leon into a widely
applicable barrier to suppression on Fourth Amendment grounds
absent “deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct” or
153
“recurring or systematic negligence.” A deterrence-based line of
reasoning in the context of policing and criminal trials has led the
Court to roughly the same threshold fault gatekeeping rule as the
“policy” considerations invoked in the distinct constitutional tort
154
155
context. Just as in the tort context, moreover, a fault-based
gatekeeping rule for suppression creates a category of cases in which
a person has neither an ex ante opportunity to challenge a
government action, nor any ex post remedy for a constitutional
156
violation.

151. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1995).
152. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 140 (2009); see also Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427
(stating that “[w]hen the police exhibit ‘deliberate,’ ‘reckless,’ or ‘grossly negligent’ disregard
for Fourth Amendment rights, [then] the deterrent value of exclusion is strong”).
153. Herring, 555 U.S. at 144. Herring’s formulation was anticipated by Franks v. Delaware,
which held that criminal defendants could invalidate a warrant based on flaws in the underlying
affidavits only in cases of “deliberate falsehood” or “reckless disregard of the truth.” Franks v.
Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978).
154. The analogy between the two lines of cases was anticipated in Richard A. Posner,
Excessive Sanctions for Governmental Misconduct in Criminal Cases, 57 WASH. L. REV. 635,
638–40 (1982), which argues that both exclusion of evidence and officer liability for Fourth
Amendment violations risk overdeterrence of legitimate law enforcement activity. Although
this deterrence argument is not the object of my analysis here, it is worth noting a certain
confusion in the argument Posner offers. Posner’s analysis assumes that there is a social welfare
function that assigns no particular value to constitutional rights. But it is not clear why this
should be so. To the contrary, one way of understanding a constitution is as a statement of the
particular forms of human welfare that are of special concern to the polity. To assign no
particular weight to constitutional violations, as Posner’s analysis does, is to fail to apply the
salient social-welfare function for our society. The verbal formulations of the concern differs,
although the substantive concern is identical: in the tort context, the Court expresses concerns
about deterring beneficial action; in the exclusionary rule context, the Court finds no need to
deter unconstitutional actions.
155. Cf. David Rudovsky, The Qualified Immunity Doctrine in the Supreme Court: Judicial
Activism and the Restriction of Constitutional Rights, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 23, 53 (1989) (noting
that qualified immunity often leaves “an official’s conduct . . . governed by the subconstitutional
immunity standard . . . [and] without a clear guide for future conduct”).
156. See Donald Dripps, Living with Leon, 95 YALE L.J. 906, 907 (1986) (noting that “the
Leon majority has withdrawn that remedy in a class of cases for which no other remedy is
available”). As a practical matter, criminal defendants will have no cost-effective damages
remedy for knock-and-announce violations and many other searches that generate inculpatory
evidence.
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One other extension of Leon merits elaboration here. The
Court’s focus on overdeterrence suggests that its fault gatekeeping
rule should not be extended to intentional Fourth Amendment
violations or the substance of Fourth Amendment law. As in the
constitutional tort context, however, fault has seeped out from the
domain in which its notional deterrence-related justifications apply to
domains in which its justification does not obtain. In Hudson v.
157
Michigan, the Court held that the exclusionary rule was inapplicable
158
to violations of the “knock-and-announce” rule for executing
warrants on the ground that the interests protected by the knock-andannounce rule were causally unrelated to the likelihood that evidence
159
would be discovered. In addition to leaning on the (obviously
flawed) logic that suppression would fail to create an incentive for
police to comply with a constitutionally compelled rule, the Hudson
Court fell back on the assertion that the “increasing professionalism
160
of police forces” meant exclusion was no longer necessary. The
force of this argument is hard to discern: even if police are
professionalized, this does not mean that they will necessarily follow a
constitutional rule that can by law be violated without consequences.
To the contrary, as Professor David Sklansky has noted, when
California amended its state constitution to provide that garbage
searches were unconstitutional but that no exclusionary rule applied,
police were “trained to ignore” that constitutional rule, and instead
161
conduct illegal garbage searches. Professionalism simply increased
the alacrity with which unconstitutional practices diffused across
police departments. To assume, as the Hudson Court seems to, that
professionalism correlates with diminished rates of constitutional
violation is not obviously justified.
In 2015, the Court extended the fault rule from the remedies
context to substantive Fourth Amendment law, tracking the
162
remedies-to-substance spillover observed in constitutional tort law.
Again, the deterrence rationale for this migration is hard to discern.

157. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006).
158. See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931–32 (1995) (imposing knock-and-announce
rule for warrant executions).
159. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 594.
160. Id. at 598.
161. David Alan Sklansky, Is the Exclusionary Rule Obsolete?, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 567,
580–81 & n.70 (2008) (citation omitted).
162. See supra Part I.B.2.
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163

In Heien v. North Carolina, the Court, with a lone dissent from
Justice Sotomayor, held that a police stop based on an erroneous
police belief that a criminal law had been broken did not violate the
Fourth Amendment provided that the officer’s “not . . . perfect” grasp
164
of the law was “reasonable.” Heien extends Leon’s logic to the
substance of the Fourth Amendment. Again, Heien’s justification is
elusive: it is not obvious why police officers charged with executing
the law should not work under an incentive to become accurately
informed about it, especially when citizens work under a parallel
165
obligation. The Court’s own deterrence rationale no longer explains
(if it ever did) why fault was extended to the Fourth Amendment’s
suppression remedy. Rather, as with the constitutional tort context, a
close study of doctrinal development suggests that the Court is the
principal architect in this fault rule, and that looming large among its
motives is an institutional concern with judicial economy.
Once nested in Fourth Amendment law, the fault rule proved
contagious across remedial boundaries within criminal procedure law.
Consider the Fifth Amendment prophylactic regime of Miranda v.
166
Arizona. Early cases applying Miranda eschewed any notion of

163. Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014).
164. Id. at 536 (holding that a “reasonable mistake of law” by police did not violate the
Fourth Amendment).
165. Mistakes of law occur in the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination context and are not
given exculpating significance there. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 531–32
(1987) (Brennan, J., concurring) (noting that the petitioner did not invoke his Fifth Amendment
right to counsel when he agreed to speak to police, but not to give a written statement without a
lawyer present); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 424–26 (1986) (finding affirmative police
misrepresentations about availability of defendant’s lawyer did not undermine waiver of Fifth
Amendment rights). The Court has also taken a pitiless view of habeas petitioners’ filing errors,
even when those errors are made in reliance upon a judge’s directions. See Bowles v. Russell,
551 U.S. 205, 207–08 (2007). It is, to be sure, possible to imagine justifications for treating
officials’ and citizens’ errors asymmetrically. Yet the repeated character of officials’ encounters
with the law, the distribution of educational and other epistemic resources, and the simple
possibility of training—with the concomitant risk of moral hazard from judicial exculpation of
official error—all list against the sort of unilateral mercy that the Court has evinced.
166. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 447–48 (1966) (discussing the necessity of placing a
limit on the methods useable by police conducting custodial interrogations). Miranda requires
the delivery of four warnings and the securing of a waiver of Fifth Amendment rights prior to
custodial interrogation. Id. at 467–76. The failure to give the warnings, however, does not
necessarily lead to exclusion even absent fault. See, e.g., Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 449–
51 (1974) (permitting the use of testimony given by third party whose identity was derived from
a statement obtained in violation of Miranda); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224–26 (1971)
(allowing the use for impeachment purposes of voluntary statements obtained in violation of
Miranda). Moreover, it is unclear whether Miranda is constitutionally compelled. When
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fault. A fault rule entered Fifth Amendment jurisprudence in
litigation over a police tactic that involved violating Miranda by
failing to give warnings, giving the requisite warnings, and then
rehearsing the same questions to obtain testimony that had previously
168
been aired. In Oregon v. Elstad, the Court held that a second
statement obtained after warnings could be admitted even if it was
169
arguably the product of a first unwarned statement. Confronted by
a deliberate strategy of using unwarned questioning to inform
170
Mirandized interrogation in Missouri v. Seibert, however, the Court
fragmented, with a plurality adopting an approach that purported to
171
focus solely on the efficacy of any warning eventually delivered.
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, however, focused on the intentional
quality of the Miranda violation, importing a notion of fault (albeit
not the unreasonable fault that characterizes other remedial
172
domains). Subsequently, several lower courts have looked to
officers’ intentions to analyze Miranda violations in the two-stage
173
interrogation context. Hence, the operative Fifth Amendment
remedial rule in Seibert’s wake increasingly tracks the fault-based
logic of Leon and its progeny in sorting for deliberate constitutional
violations and disregarding negligent violations. Fault’s seemingly
inexorable spread as a threshold trigger for suppression remedies
confirms its ascendance as a regulative principle for individualized
constitutional remedies in general.
D. Fault in Postconviction Habeas Jurisprudence
The third remedial domain in which fault has come to play a
pivotal rationing function is postconviction habeas review. Since 1867,
the postconviction writ has provided a procedural vehicle for state
presented with the question whether Miranda violations can be enforced via constitutional tort
suits, the Court fragmented. See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003).
167. See, e.g., Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 682–83 (1988).
168. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
169. Id. at 306–10.
170. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2000).
171. Id. at 604–06 (plurality opinion) (Souter, J.).
172. Id. at 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
173. See, e.g., United States v. Pacheco-Lopez, 531 F.3d 420, 427 n.11 (6th Cir. 2008)
(declining to resolve the issue because the statement would be suppressed under any applicable
framework); United States v. Materas, 483 F.3d 27, 33 (1st Cir. 2007) (noting the officer acted in
good faith, and discussing the plurality’s test); United States v. Stewart, 388 F.3d 1079, 1090 (7th
Cir. 2004) (stating that “at least as to deliberate two-step interrogations,” there is a
“presumptive rule of exclusion, subject to a multifactor test”).
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and federal prisoners to challenge their confinement on the ground
that there was a constitutional error in their initial criminal
174
The present law of postconviction review is
adjudication.
175
labyrinthine. I focus here on advancing three relatively limited
claims. First, a fault rule plays the same gatekeeping function in the
habeas context as it does in the constitutional tort and the
exclusionary rule domains. Second, even though postconviction
habeas is necessarily a statutory creation, it has been the Court that
has taken the laboring oar by endowing fault with a regulative
function. Tracking the etiology of the fault rule in the constitutional
tort context, the parallel habeas rule has evolved incrementally
through a process of common-law adjudication. And third, this
regulative function is best explained in terms of judicial-economy
176
concerns.
From its inception, the midcentury reinvigoration of collateral
relief from state criminal convictions attracted fierce criticism for its
177
psychological and practical toll upon state criminal justice systems.
178
It was not, however, until 1989 that the Court in Teague v. Lane
began to carve out a safe harbor for state officials who complied with
contemporaneously
applicable
constitutional
rules—and
correspondingly began to deny relief to litigants who failed to identify
179
an especially glaring constitutional error. Formally a rule about
retroactivity, Teague in fact tracked the early versions of fault found
180
181
in cases such as Pierson v. Ray and Arizona v. Evans. By holding

174. See Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385, 385–86. For a comprehensive
history of postconviction review, see Larry W. Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S. CAL. L.
REV. 2331, 2350–76 (1993).
175. I have offered a synthesis in Huq, supra note 9, at 531–53.
176. For an earlier account of the primacy of judicial preferences over the shape of habeas,
see id. at 523; see also John H. Blume, AEDPA: The “Hype” and the “Bite,” 91 CORNELL L.
REV. 259, 262 (2006) (“While the Court maintains that the scope of the writ is primarily for
Congress to determine, it does not, in my view, really believe that to be true . . . . [It] has
assumed a fair share of the responsibility for determining the scope of habeas review, or how
much habeas is enough.”).
177. See, e.g., Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 452–53 (1963) (arguing that finality is a critical element of the
criminal justice system which is undermined by procedural elements which permit extensive
collateral challenges to final sentencing).
178. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
179. Id. at 301.
180. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553–54 (1967). See supra notes 96–99 and accompanying
text.
181. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1995). See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
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that habeas petitioners could not obtain relief based on violations of
182
constitutional rules announced after their convictions became final,
it held state officials responsible for extant constitutional law, but not
potential expansions. That Teague was inspired by the logic of
qualified immunity was immediately apparent to sophisticated
183
observers, even if not explicit in the decision. Just how far the Court
would take the analogy would take time to surface.
The next doctrinal move toward a fault rule in habeas came a
year later. The Court held that state-court convictions would be
assessed for Teague novelty against a specific and granular version of
the precedent, not the general principle of constitutional law
184
embodied by the case. This development paralleled the demand for
185
specificity in constitutional tort law. As in the constitutional tort
context, the demand that habeas petitioners identify a specific rule
extant at the time their convictions became final meant that “any
decision, reasonably distinguishable on its facts from prior decisions,”
could be ranked as an unenforceable new rule, especially as the mere
fact of “actual disagreement among courts” counted as evidence of
186
reasonable disagreement.
Here, the evolution of fault in postconviction review diverges
from its trajectory in the constitutional tort and exclusionary rule
contexts: unique to the habeas context is a measure of congressional
involvement in the form of the 1996 Anti-Terrorism and Effective
187
Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). AEDPA imposed a suite of new
constraints on postconviction petitions, including a new statute of
limitation, more stringent rules against seriatim petitions, and a more
182. Teague, 489 U.S. at 301; see also Linda Meyer, “Nothing We Say Matters”: Teague and
New Rules, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 423, 425 (1994) (characterizing and criticizing Teague’s holding
that “convictions should not be overturned on the basis of constitutional violations that state
courts could not have known of, let alone avoided, at the time a case was tried”).
183. See Richard H. Fallon & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1735 (1991) (drawing this comparison).
184. See Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 409, 414–15 (1990). It is indicative of conscious
borrowing of doctrinal innovations from other remedial domains that Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
Butler opinion cites Leon with approval. Id. at 414. The convergence of qualified immunity and
habeas doctrine is noted in Ann Woolhandler, Demodeling Habeas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 575, 635–
40 (1993).
185. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
186. Meyer, supra note 182, at 442; see also Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 183, at 1761 (citing
Butler as an example of the “starkly positivist view” that “when consensus dissolves . . . judicial
formulation of new law is rather unconstrained”).
187. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214
(1996).
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188

onerous standard of review. But in terms of its key fault rule,
AEDPA was largely anticipated by judicial developments, and the
effect of AEDPA has proved to be largely a function of judicial
glosses—interpretations that have altered dramatically over time
189
absent any congressional updating. The semblance of congressional
control, in short, is largely illusory: calibration of the fault rule in
habeas jurisprudence has, in significant measure, fallen within judicial
discretion.
The primacy of judicial policy discretion in fault’s emergence can
be perceived by placing AEPDA in a larger context. Prior to
AEDPA, Teague deference to state-court determinations applied
solely to pure questions of law, not the mixed questions of law and
190
fact that dominate in habeas practice. Asked to extend Teague
deference prior to AEDPA in 1992, the Court splintered in Wright v
191
West, with Justice Thomas’s opinion pressing toward an expansion
192
of Teague securing only two other votes. What the Court could not
muster a majority to install by common-law adjudication, Congress
was able to push through in the heated aftermath to a major domestic
193
terrorism incident. Four years after West, Congress included in
AEDPA stringent standards of review for legal and factual error of
194
state-court convictions. Assuming the state court reached the
merits, AEDPA directed that its decision could be adjudged on the
merits only if “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application
of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

188. See Blume, supra note 176, at 270–74 (summarizing AEDPA’s core provisions).
189. Huq, supra note 9, at 530–32, 531 n.42.
190. See Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 112 (1985) (stating that mixed questions of fact and
law are “subject to plenary federal review” on habeas); accord Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277,
289, 294 (1992) (noting validity of Miller after Teague).
191. Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277 (1992).
192. Id. at 294 (suggesting, without holding, that deference should be extended to mixed
questions of fact and law).
193. Notwithstanding Justice Thomas’s failure to forge a majority in West, subsequent
majority opinions echoed his language, rather than the more generous terms of the West
concurrences. See, e.g., O’Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 156 (1997) (“[W]e will not disturb a
final state conviction or sentence unless it can be said that a state court, at the time the
conviction or sentence became final, would have acted objectively unreasonably by not
extending the relief later sought in federal court.”); Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 467 (1993)
(stating that federal habeas relief is appropriate only if “reasonable jurists hearing petitioner’s
claim at the time his conviction became final would have felt compelled by existing precedent to
rule in his favor” (citation omitted)).
194. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) & (2) (2012)).
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195

Court of the United States.” Like qualified immunity, this is a
gatekeeping rule. Habeas petitioners who surmount that hurdle still
196
have to establish an independent entitlement to constitutional relief.
As enacted, AEDPA’s core gatekeeping rule, codified in 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), merely accomplished what Justice Thomas
exhorted in West. It extinguished most de novo review in federal
habeas consideration of state criminal convictions in favor of a faultbased standard akin to the demand for evidence of an unambiguously
197
unconstitutional action in constitutional tort law. That fault rule,
moreover, applied to not just questions of law but also mixed
questions of law and fact. As a legislative enactment, AEDPA thus
mimicked previously expressed judicial preferences.
But the fault rule of § 2254(d)(1) did not remain fixed.
Notwithstanding the absence of formal statutory changes, the Court
has incrementally altered its interpretation of that provision to the
point where relief is available only when a state-court violation of
constitutional rights is, in effect, grossly negligent or intentional. This
process of common-law adjudication has over time aligned the fault
rule for habeas with the fault rule for postconviction relief and for
suppression remedies. This process of shifting legal meaning in the
absence of statutory change suggests again that the relative strength
of the fault rule even under AEDPA has been a function of judicial
preference rather than the plain meaning of the statutory text.
Section 2254(d)(1) was first interpreted by the Supreme Court in
198
the 2000 case of Williams v. Taylor to permit merits consideration of
a habeas petitioner’s claim only when “the state court arrives at a
conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law
or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a
set of materially indistinguishable facts,” or alternatively, when the
state court “identifies the correct governing legal principle from this
Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts

195. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Factual errors are cognizable only if “unreasonable.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(2). The latter provision, however, interacts with other elements of AEPDA in ways
that have not yet been fully resolved. See, e.g., Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 293 (2010) (noting a
circuit conflict about how the reasonableness rule in § 2254(d)(2) interacts with the presumption
in favor of state court factual conclusions in § 2254(e)(1), but declining to resolve it).
196. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).
197. James S. Liebman, Apocalypse Next Time?: The Anachronistic Attack on Habeas
Corpus/Direct Review Parity, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1997, 2015–16 (1992) (noting that de novo
review on habeas was the central target of Justice Thomas’s critique).
198. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
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199

of the prisoner’s case.” While this standard might sound demanding,
the Williams plurality expressly rejected an even harsher circuit court
gloss on § 2254(d)(1) to the effect that “a state-court judgment is
‘unreasonable’ (and hence invalid) only if all reasonable jurists would
agree that the state court was unreasonable, and granted habeas
200
relief.”
Over the subsequent fifteen years, the Court recalibrated the
meaning of AEDPA deference, and adopted that lower-court
201
standard, despite Congress’s failure to amend § 2254(d)(1). By 2011,
Justice Kennedy could say on behalf of a supermajority of the Court
that habeas relief was warranted for legal error under AEDPA only if
“there is no possibility fair-minded jurists could disagree that the state
202
court’s decision conflicts with this Court’s precedents.” Subsequent
to that reformulation of the § 2254(d)(1) standard, the Court further
narrowed the availability of review by holding that the “clearly
established” federal law relevant to the § 2254(d)(1) inquiry
encompassed only decisions handed down when the state court ruled,
203
rather than when that ruling became final. Important to my
argument here, this decision was unanimous: the fault rule is
uncontroversial across ideological lines in the habeas context, just as
it is uncontroversial in the constitutional tort and (sometimes) in the
exclusionary rule context. Accordingly, there is a wide consensus
within the Court that habeas relief should be available now only
where
a
petitioner
can
demonstrate
“the
exceptional
204
blameworthiness of the state” —a state of affairs that parallels
developments in the constitutional tort and the exclusionary rule
contexts.
In sum, the present crystallization of the fault rule in
postconviction habeas is a function of judicial rather than
congressional preferences. As early as 1953, Justice Jackson worried

199. Id. at 412–13 (2000).
200. Id. at 377 (emphasis added) (discussing the interpretation of § 2254(d)(1) applied in
Green v. French, 143 F.3d 865, 870 (4th Cir. 1998)).
201. For a detailed account of this process, see Huq, supra note 9, at 536–41.
202. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011) (8-0 decision). The court in Harrington
further stated that only “extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice system” warrant
relief. Id. (citation omitted). Although Harrington was not unanimous, it has been cited
approvingly in subsequent unanimous opinions. See, e.g., Nevada v. Jackson, 133 S. Ct. 1990,
1992 (2013) (per curiam); Metrish v. Lancaster, 133 S. Ct. 1781, 1787 (2013).
203. Greene v. Fisher, 132 S. Ct. 38, 45 (2011).
204. Huq, supra note 9, at 581.
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about the demoralizing effect of a “flood” of habeas cases. His
worry did not abate over time. To the contrary, the volume of habeas
petitions increased by more than one third between the mid-1970s
206
and the late 1989 Teague rule. The year that Teague was decided,
Justice Kennedy (albeit writing in dissent) warned against decisions
that “increase prisoner litigation and add to the burden on the federal
207
courts.” During the 1980s both Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Powell frequently spoke out about the costs of habeas in terms of
208
delay, especially in the capital context.
Simultaneously,
administration officials such as the Attorney General decried “the
209
flood of habeas corpus petitions engulfing our federal courts.” The
story recounted here—in which a fault rule is adopted at the Court’s
urging and then gradually rendered more onerous through commonlaw recalibration—is one that is most easily explained, at least in
substantial part, by the institutional interests of the judiciary.
II. THE CAUSAL LINK BETWEEN REMEDIAL RATIONING AND
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
This Part advances the causal claim that fault, as a regulative
principle for rationing scarce judicial resources, finds at least some
causal foundation in the institutional independence of the federal
judiciary above and beyond the ideological and policy-focused
concerns that immediately spring to mind. I develop four arguments

205. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 537 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“It must prejudice
the occasional meritorious application to be buried in a flood of worthless ones. He who must
search a haystack for a needle is likely to end up with the attitude that the needle is not worth
the search.”).
206. BRANDON L. GARRETT & LEE KOVARSKY, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS: EXECUTIVE
DETENTION AND POST-CONVICTION LITIGATION 135 (2013) (presenting data on state
postconviction filings between 1941 and 2010).
207. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 259–60 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Marin Levy has
demonstrated that the Court has maintained an inconsistent view toward floodgates arguments
in the habeas context, sometimes accepting them and sometimes repudiating them as
inconsistent with the statutory text. Marin K. Levy, Judging the Flood of Litigation, 80 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1007, 1043–49 (2013). Levy’s focus, however, is on the kind of arguments the Court
deploys, and not the effects of doctrine on caseload volumes. My aim is to explain the evolving
contours of doctrine, and for that purpose rhetoric is not necessarily probative.
208. Bryan A. Stevenson, The Politics of Fear and Death: Successive Problems in Capital
Federal Habeas Corpus Cases, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 699, 723–25 (2002).
209. Ira P. Robbins, Whither (or Wither) Habeas Corpus?: Observations on the Supreme
Court’s 1985 Term, 111 F.R.D. 265, 266–67 (1987) (footnote omitted). Rhetorical invocation of a
“flood” of habeas petitions dates back at least to Professor Bator’s landmark article. See Bator,
supra note 177, at 506.
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for the conclusion that judicial independence—understood as the
federal judiciary’s autonomy, not a characteristic of any individual
judge—has played a role in catalyzing the fault-based rationing of
constitutional remedies. First, building on evidence presented in Part
I, I repudiate arguments for attributing fault’s contours to Congress
or the strategic behavior of litigants. Second, I suggest reasons for
concluding that the doctrinal developments described in Part I were
not motivated wholly by ideological change. These two lines of
arguments clear space for alternative explanations focused on
institutional interests. The third argument I develop is a historical
account of those institutional interests that adds context and
affirmative circumstantial evidence for attributing the fault rule to
judicial independence. Finally, I present a powerful piece of
circumstantial evidence: the fault rule does not encompass all forms
of constitutional remediation, and its scope is better explained by
institutional, rather than ideological, interests.
A. Fault as a Judicial or a Congressional Rule
The first piece of evidence linking the gatekeeping fault rule for
individual constitutional remedies to the institutional interests of the
federal judiciary is the origin of that rule: as Part I suggested, it is
impossible to attribute the fault rule’s emergence to legislative
initiative. To the contrary, it has emerged from the judiciary via
common-law adjudication, with only occasional support from the
legislative branch of the federal government. Further, this fault rule
cannot be ascribed merely to the different incentives and resources of
litigants.
1. Fault as a Legislative Imposition? One implication of the
analysis offered in Part I is that Congress, notwithstanding its
210
formally plenary control of federal courts’ jurisdiction, plays little
211
direct role in crafting constitutional remedies. That analysis shows
that at least in the individual remedies domain, Congress’s influence
210. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 1 (“The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested
in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish.”).
211. This is not to say that legislators do not play an indirect role. Docket pressures in
statutory cases for example influence not only adjudicative procedures, but also substantive
outcomes. Bert I. Huang, Lightened Scrutiny, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1115 (2011) (finding that
“when flooded by the [administrative] agency cases, . . . circuit courts began to reverse district
court rulings less often—in the civil cases”).

HUQ IN PRINTER-FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

42

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

10/6/2015 11:46 AM

[Vol. 65:1

is notable mainly by its absence. This is true in regard to both the
creation and the evisceration of remedies. To be sure, Congress was
responsible for enacting both a civil-damages remedy against states
for constitutional violations in 1871 and a postconviction habeas writ
212
in 1867. But both remedies lay dormant for three-quarters of a
century before being revived by the Court. And, as Part I
demonstrated at length, the subsequent contraction of habeas review,
the exclusionary rule, and constitutional tort actions have also largely
213
been the work of the courts rather than Congress. This is most
obviously so with qualified immunity, a doctrine unembarrassed by
any purchase in statutory text, but openly motivated by the Court’s
214
own “considerations of public policy” since the 1970s. That doctrine
“represent[s] a remarkable exercise of judicial creativity,” not an
215
exemplar of legislative control.
This is not to say Congress plays no role at all. In some respects,
Congress has seconded the Court’s campaign to constrain individual
constitutional remedies. But its main interventions, AEPDA and the
216
Prison Litigation Reform Act were enacted in 1996—many years
after the main elements of the fault-based regime described in Part I
217
were already in place. As Part I.D. explored at length, AEDPA’s
role in catalyzing the fault rule in habeas is overstated: that rule, now
embodied in § 2254(d)(1), was anticipated by Justice Thomas four
years before AEDPA’s enactment, and the writ’s effectiveness has
fluctuated over time as the Court’s view of it has grown increasingly
minatory. To understand AEDPA’s installation of fault in
§ 2254(d)(1) as a de facto delegation to the Court, which would then
independently calibrate that rule, is, moreover, consistent with a
legislative history that is ambiguous, conflicted, and far less amenable

212. See supra Part I.A.
213. See supra Part I.A.
214. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506–07 (1978); see supra Part I.B.1.
215. James E. Pfander, Iqbal, Bivens, and the Role of Judge-Made Law in Constitutional
Litigation, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 1387, 1389 (2010).
216. Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801–810, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321–66
(1996).
217. This is not to say that these measures did not meaningfully supplement previous
judicial efforts at rationing. The Prison Litigation Reform Act, for example, was “highly
successful in reducing litigation, triggering a forty-three percent decline over five years.” Margo
Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1694 (2003).
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to unilaterally statist readings than the Court has sometimes
218
suggested.
In other respects, Congress has either been rebuffed or taken a
more lenient view of constitutional plaintiffs than the Court. On the
one hand, on some occasions, Congress intervenes, seemingly to
promote a trend a majority of the Court has already endorsed, and its
intrusion is deemed by the Justices to be an insult to judicial
suzerainty over constitutional interpretation. Justices, not legislators,
therefore have the last word for all practical purposes over the
remedial dispensation. In the wake of Miranda v. Arizona, for
example, Congress directed that a statement made by a defendant in
219
custody “shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given.” In
220
Dickerson v. United States, however, the Court notoriously held that
Congress could not supersede Miranda because the latter had
221
announced a “constitutional rule,” a ruling that rested upon “a
strong statement of judicial supremacy in constitutional
222
interpretation” rather than a shared hermeneutic responsibility.
On yet other occasions, Congress has been more solicitous of
plaintiffs seeking constitutional remedies than the Court. For
example, rather than narrowing Bivens, Congress has taken care to
preserve that remedy when regulating government tort liability via
223
the Westfall Act. The Westfall Act virtually immunizes federal
government officials from state common-law tort liability, substituting
the government as a defendant upon the issuance of a certification by
the Attorney General. Congress, however, expressly declared the
exclusivity rule inapplicable to suits brought against government
224
officials “for a violation of the Constitution of the United States,” a
category that most obviously reaches Bivens actions. In short, even in
limiting governmental liability, Congress was careful to preserve
218. Lee Kovarsky, AEDPA’s Wrecks: Comity, Finality, and Federalism, 82 TUL. L. REV.
443, 445 (2007) (“Given what we know about AEDPA’s legislative history, there is little support
for the argument that courts should interpret AEDPA’s ambiguities with any particular
purposes in mind.”).
219. See Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 3501(a), 82 Stat. 197, 210 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3501(a) (2012)).
220. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
221. Id. at 460.
222. Michael C. Dorf & Barry Friedman, Shared Constitutional Interpretation, 2000 SUP. CT.
REV. 61, 62.
223. Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988 (Westfall
Act), Pub. L. No. 100-694, 102 Stat. 4563.
224. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2)(A) (2012).
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individual-officer suits created by the Court. This is in striking
225
contrast to the Court’s hostility to Bivens actions.
A possible rejoinder to this line of argument might posit that the
226
Court operates in the shadow of legislative correction. On this view,
it is impossible in the absence of a constitutional ruling to attribute
doctrinal change to judicial preferences given the omnipresent
possibility of legislative correction. As a theoretical matter, this view
fails to account for the nature of legislation produced by a bicameral
legislative system attended by a presidential veto. A now canonical
body of work in political science demonstrates that in any political
system with “many veto players separated by large ideological
227
distance . . . legislation can only be incremental.” Moreover, as the
complexity, difficulty, and enactment costs of legislative specification
rise, legislators will tend more and more to delegate decisions rather
228
than resolve hard questions themselves.
As a result, “[t]he
constitutional process for enacting legislation, which requires all
legislative proposals to pass through two chambers of Congress and
be presented to the President (or, in the event of a presidential veto,
to survive supermajority votes in the House and Senate), provides
229
considerable protection for federal jurisdiction.”
As an empirical matter, the argument from legislative dominance
230
grossly overstates the efficacy of congressional control. As Professor
Tara Grove has documented, “[t]he history of federal jurisdiction
from the late nineteenth century to the present day demonstrates that
the lawmaking procedures of Article I have repeatedly safeguarded
231
the federal judiciary.” Widening the lens, empirical work by
Professor William Eskridge and others shows the probability of
225. See Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 45, at 118 (noting that the Court “has grown a
good deal more circumspect” in extending Bivens to new doctrinal contexts).
226. I have not been able to locate any published work taking this position, but the
argument has been pressed upon me in correspondence and conversations with much eloquence
and force by Mike Seidman.
227. George Tsebelis, Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies: An
Empirical Analysis, 93 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 591, 605 (1999). Tsebelis is describing parliamentary
systems, but the point applies here.
228. DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A TRANSACTION
COST APPROACH TO POLICY-MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS 197 (1999).
229. Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Safeguards of Federal Jurisdiction, 124 HARV. L.
REV. 869, 871 (2011).
230. For an empirical test that finds little evidence that the Court anticipates legislative
correction, see Ryan J. Owens, The Separation of Powers and Supreme Court Agenda Setting, 54
AM. J. POL. SCI. 412, 419–24 (2010).
231. Grove, supra note 229, at 916.
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congressional override to be diminishing over time, with successful
legislation characterized by bipartisan efforts at updating regulatory
policy, rather than controversial and divisive “corrections” of
232
Supreme Court errors. There is little cause for a policy-minded
Court, that is, to anticipate legislative intervention by trimming its
sails.
2. Fault as an Outcome of Litigant Incentives? If legislative
incentives do not predict or explain the use of fault to ration
constitutional remedies, is there some other factor exogenous to the
federal courts that might do explanatory work? More than forty years
ago, Professor Marc Galanter pointed out that “[r]epeat play”
litigants, who are able to identify relatively technical issues upon
which liability turns, will, all else being equal, prevail more frequently
233
than one-shot claimants. Consistent with this insight, the Solicitor
General acting on behalf of the United States enjoys an unusual
234
success rates in the Court. That office is perhaps uniquely situated
to stymie effective channels of constitutional redress. Can the fault
rule then be attributed to the ability of government litigants to
coordinate with low transaction costs, to select favorable test cases for
certiorari review, and to persist where individual litigants might sag?
The short answer is no. Litigant resources cannot explain the
emergence and migration of fault that was described in Part I for a
number of reasons. First, it is easy to overstate the government’s
235
success rate (especially of late), and to forget that there are
232. Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional Overrides of
Supreme Court Statutory Decisions, 1967–2011, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1317, 1319 (2014) (finding that
after the 1990s, “overrides declined as dramatically as they had ascended”). Further, “override
statutes frequently supported by bipartisan majorities in Congress [] have as their stated goal
the updating of public law, rather than ‘correction’ of judicial mistakes.” Id. at 1320. It is very
unlikely that the Justices imposing the fault rule did so because they anticipated a bipartisan
majority in both Houses that would overrule them otherwise. For an even more pessimistic view
of Congress’s power to override judicial decisions, see Richard L. Hasen, End of the Dialogue?
Political Polarization, the Supreme Court, and Congress, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 205, 217 (2013).
233. Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 97 (1974) (drawing the distinction).
234. For example, approximately seventy percent of the cases recommended for a certiorari
grant by the Solicitor General are reviewed by the Court. See, e.g., Adam D. Chandler, The
Solicitor General of the United States: Tenth Justice or Zealous Advocate?, 121 YALE L.J. 725,
728 (2011).
235. See Charles Hurt, The Supreme Court’s Biggest Loser: Barack Obama, WASH. TIMES
(July 1, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/jul/1/the-supreme-courts-biggestloser-barack-obama/ [http://perma.cc/H73T-Q6AJ] (arguing that the Obama administration in
2014 suffered an unusual string of high-profile losses).
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organized interest groups on the other side of many constitutionalrights issues, ranging from property-rights advocates to organizations
promoting the interests of discrete and insular racial and ethnic
groups. Second, many of the pivotal changes to the doctrine have
been effected sua sponte by the federal courts, rather than flowing
from prolonged litigation campaigns by organized government
interests. Recall for example that the catalyst for the first iteration of
a “good faith” rule in the exclusionary rule context was the Court’s
decision to add a question to a certiorari petition presenting a Fourth
236
Amendment issue. In the habeas context, the Court initially
rejected the narrowest reading of § 2254(d)(1), and then of its own
initiative tightened up that standard in a series of cases in which no
237
party demanded such increased scrutiny.
In short, reliance on congressional preferences or litigant
asymmetries is not persuasive as a theoretical matter or as a matter of
fit with the observed processes of doctrinal change. The gatekeeping
rule for constitutional remedies is better understood as a function of
judicial preferences.
B. Judicial Ideology as a Cause of Remedial Rationing
A considerable body of scholarship identifies the ideological
roots of changes to constitutional doctrine in the late 1970s and 1980s
as the Warren Court gave way to the Burger and the Rehnquist
238
Courts. In light of that scholarship, the development of fault might
be explained in simple ideological terms: the Court became more
conservative as President Nixon and other Republicans made more
239
appointments. It was also aware of, and sensitive to, changes in the
crime rate in that period—changes that confirmed the worries of new
240
conservative appointees.
And perhaps—most cynically and
236. See Petitioner’s Brief on Reargument at i, Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (No. 81430), 1983 WL 482675 (citations omitted).
237. Huq, supra note 9, at 540 (explaining that recent changes to the interpretation of
§ 2254(d)(1) were not made at the behest of the parties).
238. See, e.g., supra note 20 and sources cited therein.
239. JOHN W. DEAN, THE REHNQUIST CHOICE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE NIXON
APPOINTMENT THAT REDEFINED THE SUPREME COURT 16 (2001) (recounting then–
presidential advisor William Rehnquist’s advice to President Reagan to appoint “strict
constructionists” to the federal courts, who “will generally not be favorably inclined toward
claims of either criminal defendants or civil rights plaintiffs”).
240. See Arenella, supra note 20, at 187. But see Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court (Was It
Really So Defense-Minded?), The Burger Court (Is It Really So Prosecution-Oriented?), and
Police Investigatory Practices, in THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT
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crassly—one might suppose that some of the new Justices were less
than sympathetic to certain minority populations’ constitutional
241
claims. Given the overlapping influences of ideology, concerns
about crime control, and racialized politics, it might be thought that
there is no room for an account focused on the institutional interests
of the Supreme Court. Making a place for institutional interests,
therefore, requires some response to reductive accounts of doctrinal
change.
My aim in this section is to demonstrate that whatever role
ideology—whether subtly or crassly defined—played, it cannot
explain wholesale the development of the fault rule. That is, I do not
doubt that the changing composition of the Court over the 1970s and
1980s influenced the development of the case law. I do doubt that
242
ideology, or the politics of crime and race, is the whole story. The
primary evidence for my claim to this effect is simple: key precedent
in all three lines of cases is surprisingly bereft of sharp ideological
division. In particular, qualified immunity and habeas precedent
include frequent supermajoritarian and even unanimous opinions.
Dissent rates also seem to diminish with a speed and alacrity that
appointment-driven change cannot adequately explain. Hence, the
distribution of votes on the Court is hard to square with purely
ideological accounts. I first work through this evidence, and then
adduce a series of supplemental reasons for resisting crassly
ideological accounts.
1. Qualified Immunity. Consider first qualified immunity. The
fons et origo of much modern qualified immunity doctrine is Pierson
v. Ray, an opinion by Chief Justice Earl Warren from which only
243
244
Justice Douglas dissented. Butz v. Economou, which intimated the
WASN’T 62, 62–63, 90–91 (Vincent Blasi ed., 1983) (suggesting that the distinctions between the
Warren and Burger Courts were based more on fear of what might happen than on the more
moderate changes the Burger Court actually made).
241. See, e.g., Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Reflections on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the March
and the Speech: History, Memory, Values, 59 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 17, 56 (2015) (“The [Reaganera] concern with ‘criminal defendants’ reflected the new rhetoric of non-racial categories that
nonetheless carried racial significance for many Americans.”).
242. One problem with these ideological accounts of the Court’s conservative turn is their
general failure to recognize the historical depth of political polarization over crime, and the
complex etiology of harsh penal policy. See generally MARIE GOTTSCHALK, THE PRISON AND
THE GALLOWS: THE POLITICS OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA (2006) (discussing this
point).
243. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 558 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
244. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
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functional basis for qualified immunity and extended that immunity
to federal officials, attracted dissents only from Justices who would
245
have applied absolute immunity. The Court’s full bore adoption of a
functionalist logic in Harlow v. Fitzgerald similarly attracted only the
lone protest of Chief Justice Burger, from a statist, pro-defendant
246
perspective. The creation of absolute immunity for prosecutors in
247
Imbler v. Pachtman, once more, elicited only a concurrence from
Justices White, Brennan, and Marshall that largely approved of “the
248
judgment of the Court and . . . much of its reasoning.” Today, the
majority of applications of qualified immunity elicit not just a
249
majority, but unanimity, from the Court. For example, Justice
Scalia’s 2011 statement that qualified immunity shelters “all but the
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law,” elicited
no protests from the liberal wing of the Court, despite its distance
250
from the qualified immunity doctrine of even the Burger Court.
Qualified immunity—notwithstanding its potentially significant
normative and distributive effects—is thus beyond debate for the
current Court.
There have been instances, to be sure, in which liberal Justices
resisted the increasing calcification of constitutional tort law via
qualified immunity, but this resistance was to prove short lived. In
251
Anderson v. Creighton, for example, Justices Stevens, Brennan, and
Marshall criticized “the Court’s (literally unwarranted) extension of
qualified immunity,” noting that the Fourth Amendment’s rule of
probable cause already provided officers with ample breathing
252
room.
By 2014, however, Anderson had become sufficiently
routinized that liberal Justices not only joined opinions that cited its

245. Id. at 517 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Rehnquist
was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Stevens. Id.
246. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 822 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
247. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976).
248. Id. at 432 (White, J., concurring in the judgment, joined by Brennan & Marshall, JJ.).
249. See, e.g., Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012 (2014) (unanimous); Pearson v. Callahan,
555 U.S. 223 (2009) (unanimous).
250. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2085, 2085–90 (2011) (quoting Malloy v. Riggs, 475
U.S. 335, 341 (1985)). Justice Ginsburg, along with Justices Breyer and Sotomayor, concurred
only in the judgment, but did not object to this formulation of qualified immunity. Id. at 2087
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment).
251. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
252. Id. at 660 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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253

rule, but agreed to per curiam reversals on its basis. And where the
application of the demanding Anderson rule elicits dissents, it is a
supermajority of Justices that includes both liberals and conservatives
254
to be found insisting on a harsh application of that rule. In short,
there is little reason to gloss the emergence of qualified immunity as a
doctrinal change associated with the conservative, pro-law-and-order
wing of the Court. Rather, that doctrine has long had substantial
cross-ideological support—support that has only deepened over time.
Qualified immunity doctrine yields one further item of evidence
that suggests the role of institutional, rather than ideological,
concerns in shaping the law. In 2001, the Court held in Saucier v.
255
Katz that courts engaged in a qualified immunity analysis had to
follow a certain sequence of analysis starting with a mandatory
“initial inquiry” into whether a constitutional rule had been violated
256
before any determination of clearly established law. Writing for the
Court in Saucier, Justice Kennedy explained that this analytic
sequence would facilitate “the process for the law’s elaboration from
257
case to case” and hence ensure expeditious development of clearly
established rules to serve as a predicate for constitutional tort
258
liability. Yet eight years later, the Court in Pearson v. Callahan
unanimously abandoned the Saucier sequencing rule in favor of a rule
that allowed lower courts to forego the “initial inquiry” into the law
in favor of a ruling on whether a “clearly established” rule had been
259
violated. Because this reversal has the effect of decelerating the rate
at which constitutional rules become clearly established, it not only
increases the chances that a plaintiff subject to Pearson rule will lose,
but also diminishes the chances that many other future plaintiffs will
lose for want of a clearly established rule.
Pearson is telling not merely because it was unanimous, but
because it was liberal Justices, led by Justice Breyer, who launched

253. See, e.g., Carroll v. Carman, 135 S. Ct. 348, 350 (2014) (per curiam) (citing Anderson);
see also Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1866 (2014) (per curiam) (relying on Anderson, albeit
not so centrally, in the course of a summary reversal).
254. Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1245 (2012) (relying on Anderson to
dismiss Fourth Amendment claim); id. at 1251 (Breyer, J. concurring); id. (Kagan, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); id. at 1252 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting, joined by Ginsburg, J.).
255. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
256. Id. at 201.
257. Id.
258. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009).
259. Id. at 234.
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the call for Saucier’s reconsideration—and did so on the basis of
institutional consideration. In 2004, Justice Breyer criticized Saucier
on the ground that “when courts’ dockets are crowded, a rigid ‘order
260
of battle’ makes little administrative sense.” In 2007, he reiterated
261
his concern that the rule was “wasting judicial resources.” That is, it
was a liberal Justice who pressed first and most urgently for enlarged
application of qualified immunity’s fault rule in a way that
predictability would conduce to less clearly established law and fewer
constitutional tort recoveries. He did so expressly out of institutional
concerns related to his conception of the federal judiciary’s sound
operation. Qualified immunity doctrine, in short, embodies powerful
evidence that ideological considerations do not exhaust the causal
forces motivating the rise and currently hegemonic status of faultbased gatekeeping rules.
2. Postconviction Review.
A similar tale of ideological
convergence can be told in respect to habeas jurisprudence. At least
in the last decade or so, ideological conflict over habeas—as opposed
to over the death penalty—a distinct matter often entangled in habeas
cases—has almost wholly abated. Liberal and conservative Justices
alike praise and enforce a fault-based regime. It is certainly true that
early cases installing fault-based gatekeeping rules elicited dissents.
For example, the Court’s 2000 ruling on the meaning of § 2254(d)(1)’s
262
gatekeeping rule was highly fractured. Even then, it is worth
emphasizing the supermajority quality of many opinions. The pivotal
263
decision of Wainwright v. Sykes, which installed one of the first
fault-based rules for habeas, was 7–2, with only Justices Brennan and
264
Marshall dissenting.
Yet ideological division has proved remarkably evanescent. Even
as the Court has ratcheted up the intensity of the fault threshold for
habeas, the Court has coalesced into a united front in demanding that
260. Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 201–02 (2004) (Breyer, J., concurring). Lower courts
echoed this concern. See Lyons v. City of Xenia, 417 F.3d 565, 580 (6th Cir. 2005) (Sutton, J.,
concurring) (complaining that Saucier forced decisions on “difficult and fact-intensive
question[s]”).
261. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 430 (2007) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part); see also Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 387 (2007) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (“I believe that in order to lift the burden from lower courts we can and should
reconsider Saucier’s requirement . . . .”).
262. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 367, 399 (2000).
263. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
264. Id. at 99 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, J.).
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265

habeas petitioners satisfy Harrington v. Richter’s more onerous and
266
demanding version of the statutory fault rule that was rejected in
267
2000 by the Court at a time when it had more Republican appointees.
268
Nor is Harrington an outlier: there is a remarkable series of
decisions in which a unanimous Court, often acting per curiam, has
reversed habeas decisions without briefing or oral argument based on
269
the petitioner’s failure to show sufficient fault. These cases show
that the fault rule is so uncontroversial among all the Justices,
whether liberal or conservative, that they are willing to jettison their
270
ordinary rule against error correction. The trajectory of habeas
jurisprudence, in short, speaks to the strength of institutional, as
271
opposed to ideological, motives as a causal force.
3. The Exclusionary Rule. Finally, consider the exclusionary rule.
A fault rule for suppression remedies was justified first in judicialeconomy terms, not in overdeterrence terms. Hence, in a pre-Leon
concurrence, Justice White argued that a fault-based limitation on
suppression remedies would yield a “reduction in the number of cases
which will require elongated considerations of the probable-cause
272
question.” Nevertheless, the evidence of ideological polarization
over the exclusionary rule is weaker than in qualified immunity and
habeas contexts. But it is not absent. Whereas early cases such as

265. Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770 (2011).
266. See id. at 786; supra text accompanying note 202. Harrington was applied by a
unanimous Court without dissent in Metrish v. Lancaster, 133 S. Ct. 1781, 1787 (2013). It was
unanimously extended in Greene v. Fisher, 132 S. Ct. 38, 45 (2011), which held that the “clearly
established” federal law relevant to the § 2254(d)(1) inquiry encompassed only decisions
handed down when the state court ruled, rather than when that ruling became final.
267. Huq, supra note 9, at 581 (developing this comparison). Between 2000 and 2014,
Justices Rehnquist, O’Connor, Stevens, and Souter (all Republican appointees) resigned, while
Justices Roberts, Alito, Sotomayor, and Kagan (two Republican and two Democrat) were
confirmed.
268. In the same Term as Harrington, a supermajority of the Court also dramatically limited
the availability of evidentiary hearings in habeas. See Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1400–
01 (2011) (7-2 decision); Huq, supra note 9, at 536–37 (explaining the impact of Pinholster).
269. See, e.g., Ryan v. Schad, 133 S. Ct. 2548 (2013) (per curiam); Nevada v. Jackson, 133 S.
Ct. 1990 (2013) (per curiam); Marshall v. Rodgers, 133 S. Ct. 1446 (2013) (per curiam); Johnson
v. Williams, 133 S. Ct. 1088 (2013); Martel v. Clair, 132 S. Ct. 1276 (2012) (per curiam); Greene
v. Fisher, 132 S. Ct. 38 (2011).
270. See SUP. CT. R. 10.
271. For an extended argument to this effect, see Huq, supra note 9, at 586–93.
272. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 267 (1983) (White, J., concurring).
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273

Leon attracted multiple dissents, more recent opinions, such as
274
Arizona v. Evans, have attracted smaller dissents. And the Court’s
most recent extension of Leon in Heien v. North Carolina accrued
275
only a single protest vote.
In short, careful examination of the case law does not support
the conclusion that fault-based remedial rationing is a consequence of
ideological change alone. Although ideology has certainly been
salient, it does not capture the whole story: Justices repeatedly
emphasize caseload and judicial-economy concerns in regard to
habeas, suppression remedies, and constitutional tort. And the
coalitions observed in the jurisprudence belie any simple ideological
account. Consistent with this ideological variation, not all of the
doctrines canvassed above concern constitutional challenges typically
favored by liberal Justices and disfavored by conservative Justices.
Challenges to state taxes, for example, lack any obvious ideological
276
valence and yet are hedged by a species of the fault rule. A Bivens
claim subject to qualified immunity is available just as much to a
rancher infuriated by meddling federal land officials as a racial
277
minority subject to harassing and intrusive federal policing. To boil
the case law down to ideology, in short, is to fail to take seriously the
Court qua court, to ignore the statements of the Justices, and to blink
to observed patterns of judicial coalition-formation. It is to impose a
crude functionalism on a Court that, in practice, is much more supple
in its thinking.
C. Circumstantial Evidence of the Institutional Roots of the
Fault Rule
To claim that courts, rather than legislators or litigants, have
been responsible for the ascendency of fault is to assert that federal
judges have had both institutional means and sufficient motives to
install the regime described in Part I. There is considerable historical
and contemporaneous empirical evidence of both means and motive.
273. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 928 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by
Marshall, J.); id. at 960 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
274. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 18 (2011) (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 23 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting, joined by Stevens, J.).
275. Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 542 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
276. See Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 182 (1990) (plurality opinion)
(O’Connor, J.).
277. See, e.g., Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 548 (2007) (describing Fourth and Fifth
Amendment claims filed by rancher against federal land officials).
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Marshaling that evidence, I advance two points here to support a
causal link between judicial independence and fault-based rationing
of constitutional remedies. First, notwithstanding the clichéd image of
a federal judiciary as weak and dependent upon the political
278
branches, historians have developed an account of the federal
judiciary as an institution that as a branch has accreted gradually a
279
great deal of autonomous discretion to pursue institutional interests.
Second, empirical work identifies caseload management as a core
institutional interest of the federal judiciary. Vindicating institutional
autonomy in the federal judicial context translates as managing the
flow of cases. Focusing on the period of time in which the fault rule
developed—the late 1970s and early 1980s—in particular reveals
considerable circumstantial evidence that the Justices viewed
constitutional remediation as problematic in caseload terms. Both the
judiciary’s means and its motives for fault-based remedial rationing,
in short, are amply supported by available evidence.
1. The Judiciary’s Institutional Interest in Caseload Management.
Consider first the historical trajectory of branch-level independence.
At the time of the Founding, the constitutional text vested Congress
with broad formal authority over the jurisdictional structure and
280
funding of the federal courts.
Nevertheless, post-Founding
developments rendered such authority increasingly formal rather
than real. Rather than a function of constitutional text, therefore,
judicial independence at a branch level has emerged as a result of
281
institutional developments over the long run of American history.
There was nothing inevitable or necessary, moreover, about this
development. Instead, institutional pathways in historical time are
contingent matters, vulnerable to the accidents of personality and
278. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 522 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)
(emphasizing judicial weakness in comparison to the executive and the legislature).
279. For an account of “branch independence” as the power “to operate according to
procedural rules and administrative machinery that it fashions for itself,” as distinct from
individual judges’ independence, see Gordon Bermant & Russell R. Wheeler, Federal Judges
and the Judicial Branch: Their Independence and Accountability, 46 MERCER L. REV. 835, 837–
38, 845 (1995).
280. U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1–2 (granting Congress broad jurisdictional control); see also
Peter J. Smith, Textualism and Jurisdiction, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1883, 1892–94 (2008) (noting
“the traditional view” of Article III is that Congress has plenary power over federal
jurisdiction).
281. See J. Mark Ramseyer, The Puzzling (In)dependence of Courts: A Comparative
Approach, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 721, 746 (1994) (arguing based on a comparative analysis that
“[j]udicial independence is not primarily a matter of constitutional text”).
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exogenous shocks. Regardless of the particular pathway taken,
however, it is inevitable that an institution crafted in a handful of
words in 1789 would evolve, mutate, and even metastasize in
282
unexpected ways over two hundred years of historical time.
Recent historical work zeroes in upon the first part of the
twentieth century as a turning point. During this period, the federal
judiciary successfully lobbied Congress to delegate important
authority over key jurisdictional and administrative powers to the
bench. In 1922, for example, Congress created the Conference of
283
Senior Circuit Judges, a modest entity later to develop into the
Judicial Conference of the United States, a full-scale bureaucracy
with statutory authority to lobby by “submit[ting] to Congress . . . its
284
recommendations for legislation.” In 1925, Chief Justice William
Howard Taft engaged in “unprecedented efforts” to lobby Congress
into granting the Supreme Court almost unfettered discretion over its
caseload, near plenary authority to set its own agenda, and freedom
to determine how and why it would intervene on matters of national
285
salience. In 1934, Congress “was compelled to delegate power to the
Court” to set rules for the judiciary in the Rules Enabling Act,
signaling that “the federal judiciary had arrived as a power player in
286
the national political scene.” The subsequent creation of the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts further weakened executive
287
branch influence on the judiciary. Over this period, the executive
branch also extended support to the judiciary, which it viewed as a
vehicle for pursuing its own political agenda, in effect checking
288
congressional leverage of jurisdictional controls. The net result of
282. This is the central thesis of American Political Development (APD) theory, i.e., that “a
polity in all its different parts is constructed historically, over time” such that “the nature and
prospects of any single part will best be understood within the long course of political
formation.” KAREN ORREN & STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE SEARCH FOR AMERICAN
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 1 (2004).
283. Act of Sept. 14, 1922, ch. 306, § 2, 42 Stat. 837, 838 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 331).
284. Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-772, § 331, 62 Stat. 683, 902 (codified as amended
at 28 U.S.C. § 331).
285. Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years After
the Judges’ Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643, 1648 (2000).
286. CROWE, supra note 23, at 224 (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2000)).
287. Id. at 231–34.
288. Tara Leigh Grove, The Article II Safeguards of Federal Jurisdiction, 112 COLUM. L.
REV. 250, 260 (2012) (“The executive has a strong incentive to use its independent role in the
enactment and enforcement of federal law to preserve the scope of federal jurisdiction.”); see
also Mark A. Graber, Constructing Judicial Review, 85 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 425, 435 (2005)
(“The Taft, Harding, and Coolidge administrations fought to staff the federal judiciary with
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these accumulated reforms was to empower the judiciary with the
institutional instruments and procedural avenues to pursue its (selfdefined) interests.
Capturing this rise in branch-level judicial independence,
political scientist Kevin McGuire has assembled a longitudinal index
289
of the federal judiciary’s institutionalization. This index bundles
measures of the Supreme Court’s institutional differentiation from
other federal entities, the durability of its interests, and its autonomy
290
from other political forces. Measured over the twentieth century,
McGuire’s index evinces a steady upward trend line such that by the
1960s, the Court had become a “distinctive and independent force
291
within the federal government.” McGuire’s conclusion is supported
by a second set of studies examining how the Court exercises judicial
review. These studies of time trends in judicial exercise of the power
to invalidate state and federal statutes identifies a peak in the early
twentieth century and another peak from the 1960s through the
292
1980s. To the extent that judicial willingness to invalidate duly
enacted laws is a metric of judicial independence, the late twentieth
293
century marks one of its high water marks.
This historical evidence is complemented by a growing body of
evidence that judges act upon the basis of institutional interests
determined by their position within Article III. Of course, it is well

political actors prone to construe ambiguous Constitutional and statutory language against
labor.”). Political parties, acting across institutional lines, have also supported the growth of
judicial power. See MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS,
at viii (1981) (describing courts as institutions “by which central political regimes consolidate
their control over the countryside”); Howard Gillman, How Political Parties Can Use the Courts
to Advance Their Agendas: Federal Courts in the United States, 1875–1891, 96 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 511, 513 (2002).
289. See McGuire, supra note 23, at 130–33.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 135. Crowe argues that judicial autonomy requires political differentiation,
organization capacities, and political legitimacies—qualities that the Court obtained in the 1920s
under Chief Justice Taft. Justin Crowe, The Forging of Judicial Autonomy: Political
Entrepreneurship and the Reforms of William Howard Taft, 69 J. POL. 73, 76 (2007).
292. See Aziz Z. Huq, When Was Judicial Restraint?, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 579, 583, 587 (2012)
(identifying the post–Civil War era as a turning point in institutional development for the
Supreme Court); Keith E. Whittington, The Least Activist Supreme Court in History? The
Roberts Court and the Exercise of Judicial Review, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2219, 2228 fig.1
(2014).
293. Of course, the rate of invalidation is likely also a function of the rate of passage of
unconstitutional laws, and also the ideological gap between the Court and elected bodies at
state and federal levels. Even without holding these constant, the higher rates of invalidation are
hard to square with a Court that lacked for confidence in its own institutional station.
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known that the policy preferences of appointing presidents
powerfully shape the distribution of federal judicial candidates
294
presented to and confirmed by the Senate. A recent empirical study
by Professor Thomas Keck thus concludes that judicial motivations
295
“are shaped in part by a sense of institutional duty.” Keck examined
three possible explanations for the Supreme Court’s decision to
invalidate federal statutes: partisan differences, policy disagreements,
and institutional disagreements. Contra accounts that focus on the
partisan drivers of judicial review, Keck concluded that more than 60
percent of federal laws struck down between 1981 and 2005 are
consistent with an institutional account of judicial review in which the
Justices’ “motivation is the desire to defend judicial authority against
296
incursions from the other branches.” In contrast, most instances of
judicial review in that time period “fit uneasily” with a policy or
297
partisan differences account.
Keck’s study concerns federal
statutory invalidations, not the regulation of state criminal justice
systems. But it would be extraordinary if the Justices’ preferences
varied not just in quality but also in kind between different domains.
There is hence no reason to think that his inferences would not
extend to the doctrinal areas discussed here.
If the judiciary possesses both a degree of autonomy from other
branches and also a distinct understanding of its institutional
interests, it becomes necessary to identify those interests. Theoretical,
empirical, and self-reported data from the federal bench
demonstrates that moderating the flow of cases, and in particular
requests for constitutional remedies, comprises a central element of
the Article III judiciary’s institutional interests.

294. Susan W. Johnson & Donald R. Songer, The Influence of Presidential Versus Home
State Senatorial Preferences on the Policy Output of Judges on the United States District Courts,
36 LAW & SOC. REV. 657, 666 (2002) (expecting to find “that the practice of senatorial courtesy
might lead to judicial appointments consistent with the views of home state senators” but
discovering that “presidential preference is more than twice as influential as home state
senatorial preferences”); see also Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L.
REV. 257, 278 & n.105 (2005) (noting the “predictive success of the presidential-appointment
measure of [judicial] ideology”).
295. Keck, supra note 25, at 323; see also Thomas Brennan, Lee Epstein & Nancy Staudt,
The Political Economy of Judging, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1503, 1506 (2009) (noting that a consensus
view that “institutional factors affect judicial outcomes”) (footnote omitted).
296. Keck, supra note 25, at 336. For example, consider here the judicial response to
legislative and executive efforts to roll back the Miranda rule. See Dickerson v. United States,
530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000) (invalidating purported legislative substitute for Miranda).
297. Keck, supra note 25, at 336.
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At a theoretical level, Judge Richard Posner has posited
298
“leisure” as a central element in the judicial utility function.
Empirical studies confirm Posner’s intuition. These show that federal
judges, like any other supplier of labor, are averse to excessive
299
demands on their time. Because these demands are determined on
an institution-wide basis, it follows that federal judges must attend to
their individual interest in minimizing unwanted effort through
doctrinal tools that are systemic in character. Consistent with both the
narrow and the broad interpretation of institutional interests, both
liberal and conservative Justices alike express concern about the
ability of the federal courts to fulfill their adjudicative role given
300
rising caseloads. Rising caseloads have already overwhelmed courts’
ability to give individualized consideration to every discrete matter,
and led to the substitution of law clerk and staff attorney
301
consideration in lieu of Article III eyes.
The theoretical and empirical evidence aligns with the historical
record and self-reports from the Justices. By the 1980s, judges and
scholars uniformly defined the problem of “judicial reform” as
302
primarily a “problem . . . of workload.” This resulted in a series of
commissions, starting with the Study Group on the Caseload of the
Supreme Court, created by Chief Justice Warren Burger in 1971, to
“study backlogs in judicial business, inadequacies in judicial
performance, and potential reforms in in judicial organization or
303
The Study Group and its successors, the
administration.”
Commission on Revision of the Appellate System and the Hruska
Commission, failed to catalyze legislative action, but nonetheless

298. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Rational Judicial Behavior: A Statistical
Study, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 775, 780 (2009); see also Jonathan R. Macey, Judicial Preferences,
Public Choice, and the Rules of Procedure, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 627, 630 (1994).
299. See generally Eric Helland & Jonathan Klick, The Effect of Judicial Expediency on
Attorney Fees in Class Actions, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 171 (2007) (recounting empirical evidence of
an effort aversion among federal judges).
300. See, e.g., Henry J. Friendly, Averting the Flood by Lessening the Flow, 59 CORNELL L.
REV. 634, 642 (1974); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Reflections on the Independence, Good Behavior,
and Workload of Federal Judges, 55 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 7–13 (1983); Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Are
the Federal Courts Becoming Bureaucracies?, 68 A.B.A. J. 1370, 1371 (1982).
301. WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, INJUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE
UNITED STATES COURTS IN CRISIS 83–98 (2013) (documenting declining use of oral argument
and increasing use of law clerks and staff attorneys by the circuit courts of appeals under
caseload pressure).
302. CROWE, supra note 23, at 249.
303. Id. at 250–51.
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“raised awareness” of the caseload concern. Individual Justices
continued to raise the same concern after these commissions wound
up. Reflecting on the courts’ experience from the 1960s through the
1980s, Chief Justice Rehnquist remarked not only on “the great
increase of judicial business handled by the federal courts,” but also
“the increasing complexity of the issues now handled by the federal
305
courts.” Of course, this was not the first time that federal judges had
306
complained of capacity constraints. But it seems clear that the late
1970s and 1980s were a time at which the pressures of adjudication
were felt to be especially acute, and thus a warrant for both study and
institutional change.
2. Caseload Management in the Era of Fault. The late 1970s and
early 1980s were distinct in another way: they were the beginning of a
fourfold increase in the rate of incarceration in state and federal
307
prisons. At the time, crime appeared a major, and increasingly
intractable, national problem. Crime rates had been rising since the
1960s, with no prospect of a plateau in sight. The national homicide
rate, for example, had doubled in the decade after 1964, and was
308
continuing to rise in 1980. Street-level crime was also perceived as a
national problem, warranting responses from national institutions. In
1981, for example, the new Attorney General William French Smith,
convened a task force to determine how federal resources could be
309
switched from white-collar to street crime. Further, “[i]n the 1980s
and 1990s, criminal justice policy and practice was influenced by the

304. Id. at 251–52.
305. William H. Rehnquist, Seen in A Glass Darkly: The Future of the Federal Courts, 1993
WIS. L. REV. 1, 3.
306. During Reconstruction, for example, federal courts were tasked with a remedial role in
the former Confederacy that exceeded their capacities. See LAURA F. EDWARDS, A LEGAL
HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION: A NATION OF RIGHTS 151 (2015)
(describing experience of capacity constraints during Reconstruction).
307. See WESTERN, supra note 86, at 13.
308. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE GREAT AMERICAN CRIME DECLINE 5 (2007). Homicide
rates would drop precipitously, and unexpectedly, in the early 1990s. Id.
309. KATHERINE BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY
AMERICAN POLITICS 47 (1997); see also Harry A. Chernoff, Christopher M. Kelly & John R.
Kroger, Essay, The Politics of Crime, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 527, 533 (1996) (discussing
Reagan’s approach to crime). Other accounts, however, trace the federal interest in crime back
to the beginning of the twentieth century. GOTTSCHALK, supra note 242, at 55–76.
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notion that the country was facing an epidemic of ‘juvenile
310
superpredators.’”
Federal criminal-adjudicative policy shifted accordingly. The
absolute volume of federal criminal defendants had fluctuated
substantially since World War II. It dropped in the late 1940s and
1950s due to declining immigration enforcement. But it began
“surg[ing] between 1970 and 1977 and then [falling] back temporarily
from 1977 to 1980,” before growing “in almost every year from
311
1980.” Indeed, the “number of federal criminal prosecutions has
grown steadily, with little fluctuation, since 1980, at a rate of about
1,500 additional cases per year” with “a significant part” of that
growth due to “the growing number of controlled substance
prosecutions and stepped-up enforcement against immigration law
312
violators.” As a result, the number of federal offenders imprisoned
313
for drug offenses ballooned from 4,900 in 1980 to 98,675 in 2007.
From the perspective of the Supreme Court in the early 1980s, the
then-incipient growth of federal criminal caseloads might have
seemed to portend serious future pressures on federal dockets.
Given this constellation of factors—most of which would have
been readily apparent to the Justices—it is possible to hypothesize
that the incipient pressures of mass incarceration on the federal
courts were not lost on the Court, even at the beginning of the 1980s.
These pressures took the form of greatly increased volumes of
suppression motions and habeas petitions (from both federal and
state prisoners). Hence, during the period at which the fault rule was
developed, the Court was at the acme of its institutional autonomy,
and also inclined by habit and instruction to view the volume of
litigation as not just a problem, but the defining problem for the
federal courts. That problem, finally, likely seemed most pressing in
the criminal law domain, where increasing reliance on the carceral

310. Nick Straley, Miller’s Promise: Re-Evaluating Extreme Criminal Sentences for Children,
89 WASH. L. REV. 963, 990 (2014).
311. Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal Criminal
Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 90–91 (2005).
312. Susan R. Klein & Ingrid B. Grobey, Debunking Claims of Over-Federalization of
Criminal Law, 62 EMORY L.J. 1, 16–17 (2012).
313. Anne R. Traum, Mass Incarceration at Sentencing, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 423, 429 (2013).
For a more detailed account of the rise of mass incarceration, see Franklin E. Zimring,
Imprisonment Rates and the New Politics of Criminal Punishment, in MASS IMPRISONMENT:
SOCIAL CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 145, 145–46 (David Garland ed., 2001).
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state to solve social problems produced larger and larger caseload
314
pressures on the federal judiciary.
Can the rise of fault be explained as a response to rising crime
rates without regard to the freestanding institutional concerns of the
judiciary? There are a number of reasons for resisting this reductive
315
conclusion. First, as already recounted, the gatekeeping fault rule
did not emerge solely at the behest of Justices appointed by
presidents centrally concerned with crime control. Rather, it has been
a bipartisan project.
Second, while Justices have expressed concern with crime
control, they have since the 1950s repeatedly articulated their
resistance to constitutional remediation in terms of the judiciary’s
institutional interest in caseload management. Part II.B contains
many of these statements, ranging from Justice White’s early
316
concerns about the Fourth Amendment suppression remedy to
Justice Breyer’s concern about the burden of constitutional tort
317
litigation in the lower courts. There is no reason to view these
statements as disingenuous or false. Nor are such judicial expressions
of concern over the institutional effects of constitutional remedies
isolated. In respect to each line of ex post remedies doctrine
examined above, Justices have repeatedly expressed concern about
the manageability of litigation flows absent something like a fault
rule. In the constitutional tort context, for example, Justice Black
318
articulated a concern with “frivolous” suits in his Bivens dissent. In
the habeas context, concerns about the “disproportionate amount of
[judicial] time and energy” required for postconviction review have
319
long been stock elements in the Court’s opinions. And recently
installed limits to the exclusionary rule have been underwritten by

314. It was well known that the then-nascent war on drugs would produce many more
inmates. MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA
4–7 (1995); see also DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL 131–32 (2001)
(documenting the Reagan Administration’s turn from rehabilitation to retributive theories of
punishment). Hence, the Justices had good reason to be aware of how the number of
suppression motions and habeas petitions would increase.
315. See supra Part II.B.
316. See supra note 272 and accompanying text.
317. See supra notes 260–261 and accompanying text.
318. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 428–
29 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting). In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, the Court expressed concern about the
volume of § 1983 cases, but expressed its concerns in terms of the “diversion of official energy”
rather than the cost to the judiciary. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982).
319. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 282 n.6 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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worries about the “constant flood of alleged failures” to conform to
320
the Fourth Amendment. Remedial reform is thus perceived by the
Justices themselves as a response to the rising demand for
adjudication, a demand that is plausibly linked to the recent growth
and expected continued growth of the punitive, policing, and
incarcerating state.
Evidence from the Justices’ own lips, moreover, undermines
another potential counterargument to the effect that a fault rule
cannot be explained by caseload concerns because such a rule would
not influence the behavior of habeas petitioners, the public defenders
who represent most criminal defendants, or those aggrieved by
perceived governmental abuse. The Leon Court, for example,
worried that the availability of suppression would diminish the rate of
321
plea bargaining. Empirical evidence that this is not so has done
nothing to dent the force of the fault rule in the Fourth Amendment
322
context. Setting the effect of suppression on plea bargaining to one
side, though, it is hard to believe that the fault rule has not altered the
incentives of plaintiffs’ attorneys dependent on contingency-fee
payoffs, public defenders determining how to ration scarce time and
323
resources, or prisoners who may face real trade-offs in respect to
324
how to allocate time and effort within prison. And even if the
magnitude of these effects is in question, a fault rule might have
distinctive appeal to the Justices because it is a legal intervention that
has a clear judicial pedigree and feel, unlike (say) changes to
substantive criminal law or the funding of either prosecutors’ or
criminal defenders’ offices. It is not implausible, that is, to think of

320. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 595 (2006).
321. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984).
322. See Thomas Y. Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn)
About the “Costs” of the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other Studies of “Lost” Arrests,
1983 AM. B. & FOUND. RES. J. 611, 668 (1983) (finding no evidence of an effect on plea
bargaining).
323. For an argument that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule does create needless
litigation, and that the resources it consumes would be better allocated elsewhere, see William J.
Stuntz, The Virtues and Vices of the Exclusionary Rule, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 443, 444
(1997) (“The exclusionary rule generates a lot of litigation—tens of thousands of contested
suppression motions each year. That litigation is displacing something else, and the something
else may well have more to do with guilt and innocence.”).
324. For an impressive analysis of the hazards of incarceration, and the costly strategies
necessary to navigate them, see generally DAVID SKARBEK, THE SOCIAL ORDER OF THE
UNDERWORLD: HOW PRISON GANGS GOVERN THE AMERICAN PENAL SYSTEM (2014). As
Skarbek elegantly and comprehensively shows, the common caricature of a habeas petitioner
idling away his days filing endless writs with no other demands on his time is simply unfounded.
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fault as an obvious first resort for a judge steeped in common-law
325
ideas seeking to manage docket pressures. Finally, it is worth
emphasizing that concerns about crime and judicial capacity not only
can be complementary but can also interact: if institutional concerns
were all that mattered, for example, it might simply have altered
substantive law to be more favorable to plaintiffs, thereby
encouraging higher settlement rates, or imposed constitutional
constraints on substantive criminal law. Concern with crime removes
these possibilities from the judicial agenda, and pushes the Court to
deploy statist instruments to manage its dockets.
In tracing a causal chain from the political and social facts of
mass incarceration to judicial doctrine, my argument here contrasts
and conflicts with Professor William Stuntz’s revered criticism of the
Warren Court’s criminal procedure cases. Stuntz argues that the
judicial regulation of criminal procedure had a perverse effect
because “the very existence of defendant-protective procedural
doctrine tends to push toward lower funding and broader substantive
326
criminal law.” In this fashion, Stuntz suggests that doctrinal change
conduced to larger institutional change. Stuntz’s story, however, is
hard to square with the chronological evidence. As Professor Stephen
Schulhofer has explained, key changes to criminal sentencing are
removed by decades from the Warren Court’s criminal procedure
327
decisions. Further, other Western nations that experienced the same
punitive turn did so without any criminal procedure revolution
against which to react, suggesting that “[p]rofound structural changes
in Western industrial society lay at the heart of these developments,
328
not judicial doctrine.” But Schulhofer does not ask the logical next
question: Did those “profound structural changes” influence doctrine
in ways that alter the distribution, and at times the existence, of
constitutional remediation? And if so, what mediated those effects?
The argument developed here suggests that it did so via the
judiciary’s institutional concerns. For there is good reason to think
that even if the Court has not shaped the development of criminal

325. I am grateful to Samuel Bray for this suggestion.
326. Stuntz, Uneasy Relationship, supra note 27, at 64 (emphasis omitted). Stuntz’s claim has
been understood as historical and causal in nature. See Robert Weisberg, Crime and Law: An
American Tragedy, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1425, 1436 (2012) (explaining Stuntz’s claim to be that
“the noble commitment to constitutional procedure as a way of redressing the brutalities and
inequalities of the criminal justice system was a disastrous historical turn”).
327. Schulhofer, supra note 28, at 1076–77.
328. Id. at 1078.
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justice institutions, the latter have directly impinged upon its ability to
respond to constitutional wrongs.
The Court, in short, had both the means and the motivation to
translate its institutional autonomy into a fault-based regime of
remedial rationing. Both historical and contemporaneous evidence
suggest that judges in fact define their interests in institutional terms,
and that managing the federal courts’ caseload is central to their
conception of this institutional interest. Against this backdrop, the
innovations charted in Part I may have seemed like logical ways of
vindicating the institutional independence of the federal judiciary.
This diagnosis further suggests that the installation of the fault rule
will prove relatively durable regardless of the ideological preferences
of the next president to engage in significant appointments to the
Court. Liberal or conservative, new Justices are likely to experience
and endorse institutional perspectives on docket and case load
management just as their ideological confreres have. To look to
changing patterns of judicial appointment as a solvent of remedial
rationing in the constitutional context, therefore, may be whistling in
the wind.
D. Institutional Interests and the Boundaries of the Fault Rule
There is one final argument for glossing the fault rule as a
function of institutional preferences, and not just as a grossly
ideological effect. Under current doctrine, fault plays a regulative role
with respect to some—but not all—channels of judicial review. Where
it applies, fault operates as a tax on constitutional claim-making. It
thereby disincentivizes claims. Where it does not apply, the absence
of a fault rule is in effect a subsidy, making such challenges more
attractive. By shifting the boundaries of fault, the Court elicits and
also tamps down on different forms of claim-making. An examination
of the contours of the Court’s fault-based regime suggests that the
current dispensation is well designed to maximize the federal bench’s
prestige while minimizing its labor costs. That is, the contours of the
fault rule correspond to, and thereby promote, the institutional
329
interests of the judiciary.
Because this argument turns on some careful parsing of doctrine,
I develop it in two stages. First, I identify contexts in which the Court
329. I do not mean to suggest that any and all judicial doctrine is explained by this mix of
labor and prestige concerns, only that the detection of their influence here is further evidence
that ideology and its fellow travelers are not the sole explanations for the rise of fault.
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has declined to install a fault rule. Second, I explain how the resulting
doctrinal contours can be explained in terms of the judiciary’s
institutional interests. This account, while circumstantial, provides
one more item of evidence for attributing fault-based rationing to the
exercise of judicial independence.
1. Exceptions to the Fault Rule. Recall first that constitutional
torts, suppression motions, and habeas petitions do not exhaust the
universe of procedural mechanisms for constitutional claim-making.
Courts also entertain asks for injunctive relief pursuant to Ex Parte
330
331
Young and actions for declaratory relief. Whereas rights claimants
332
seeking relief using the former mechanism must demonstrate fault,
litigants seeking the latter forms of relief need not show anything
more than the bare fact of constitutional violation. In a Young action,
a defendant might invoke traditional equitable doctrines of unclean
333
334
hands and undue hardship, which both focus on a kind of fault.
But few, if any, reported cases turn on these rules, suggesting that
335
they do not play a large role in constitutional litigation. At least as a
general matter, therefore, the availability of equitable relief in
constitutional cases does not turn on fault.
There is, in short, a difference in the cost of asserting a
constitutional right that depends on which procedural mechanism is
employed. The ensuing differential in expected remedial value is
amplified by the simple fact that injunctive and declarative forms of
relief—unlike damages, suppression, or vacatur of a conviction—are
336
typically available prophylactically before a violation has occurred.
Prevention is generally more valuable than post hoc measures that
330. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
331. See supra notes 88–91 and accompanying text.
332. See supra Part I.
333. See, e.g., Concilio de Salud Integral de Loiza, Inc. v. Perez-Perdomo, 551 F.3d 10, 11
(1st Cir. 2008) (rejecting injunctive relief on the basis of unclean hands).
334. See generally Douglas Laycock, The Neglected Defense of Undue Hardship and the
Doctrinal Train Wreck of Boomer v. Atlantic Cement, 4 J. TORT L. 1 (2012). I have been unable
to locate any reported case in which a Young remedy was denied because of undue hardship to
the defendant.
335. In addition, neither the unclean hands doctrine nor the undue hardship doctrine train
on the kind of fault described in Part I.
336. Moreover, sovereign immunity doctrine creates a supplemental incentive to seek
forward-looking relief rather than compensatory damages. In Edelman v. Jordan, the Court
hence distinguished permissible judicial orders that required the expenditure of funds to ensure
future compliance with the Constitution, from an impermissible judicial order of
“compensation” for past harm. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 667–68 (1974).
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rarely make plaintiffs entirely whole. As a result, “federal courts
frequently entertain actions for injunctions and for declaratory relief
aimed at preventing future activities that are reasonably likely or
337
highly likely, but not absolutely certain, to take place.”
The 2013–14 Supreme Court Term provides illustrations. Susan
338
B. Anthony List v. Driehaus involved a facial First Amendment
challenge to an Ohio statute criminalizing false statements about
339
candidates during political campaigns.
Even though the only
complaint against the plaintiffs at bar had been dismissed, the
unanimous Court discerned a “substantial” enough “threat of future
340
enforcement” to establish standing. The same term, in McCullen v.
341
Coakley, the Court adjudicated another First Amendment challenge
to a Massachusetts law establishing buffer zones around abortion
clinics based on the plaintiffs’ expressed desire to enter those zones in
342
the future, rather than any past violation of the law. Anticipatory
challenges of this ilk, of course, are not limited to the First
343
Amendment context.
The doctrine, however, contains another important wrinkle. Not
all anticipatory suits are created equal. There is an important
344
difference between “facial” challenges to the semantic content of
the statute’s text, such as in Susan B. Anthony List and McCullen, and
challenges to ongoing institutional practices. Whereas facial
345
challenges to laws face low hurdles, in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,
the Court imposed a high, often insurmountable, barrier to challenges
to official practices by dint of a specific element of Article III
346
standing rules.

337. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1160 (2013) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
338. Susan B. Anthony List v. Dreihaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334 (2014).
339. Id. at 2338 (quoting and discussing Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3517.21(B)).
340. Id. at 2340, 2345.
341. McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014).
342. Id. at 2527–28 (describing plaintiffs as previously complying with the Massachusetts
buffer law).
343. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 707 (1997) (describing the due
process right to die); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 845 (1992) (plurality
opinion) (describing the due process right to abortion).
344. See Gillian E. Metzger, Facial Challenges and Federalism, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 877
(2005) (“What really distinguishes a facial challenge is not its breadth, but that it involves an
attack on the general rule embodied in a statute.”).
345. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
346. Id. at 97–98.
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To see how, consider the Court’s divergent formulations of
plaintiffs’ threshold burdens in two cases. In Susan B. Anthony List,
the plaintiffs satisfied Article III by showing that their conduct was
347
“‘arguably . . . proscribed by [the] statute’ they wish to challenge.”
Simply based on the verbal content of the challenged Ohio statute,
the unanimous Court had “no difficulty” concluding this threshold
348
had been surmounted. In Lyons, a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief
against a police chokehold practice was asked to make “the incredible
assertion either, (1) that all police officers in Los Angeles always
choke any citizen with whom they happen to have an encounter,
whether for the purpose of arrest, issuing a citation or for questioning
or, (2) that the City ordered or authorized police officers to act in
349
such manner.” Lyons in effect required a plaintiff challenging a
practice to collate a large body of evidence, not just about what the
law is, but about empirical regularities in the world. This is costly,
often prohibitively so. Perhaps unsurprising, a 2000 analysis found
that across 1,200 reported decisions applying Lyons 1,152 ended in
350
dismissal on standing grounds.
To summarize, the Court applies a fault rule to individualized
tort actions, suppression motions, and habeas petitions—all of which
challenge granular, singular official acts. No fault rule, however,
applies to requests for prospective injunctive or declaratory relief
against unconstitutional laws. Ex ante challenges to institutional
practices, by contrast, while facing no fault rule, are impeded by
Lyons rule. The net result is in some tension with the notional stated
351
352
Supreme Court disfavor of hypothetical and facial requests for
constitutional review: a relative subsidy for prophylactic facial

347. Susan B. Anthony List v. Dreihaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2344 (2014) (quoting Babbitt v.
United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979)).
348. Id.
349. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 106; see also Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 380 (1976) (limiting the
availability of ex ante relief against law enforcement officers on grounds that anticipate the
Lyons analysis).
350. Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private Citizens
in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1384, 1399 n.57 (2000).
351. Ala. State Fed’n of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450, 461 (1945); accord Lewis v. Cont’l
Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 480 (1990); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 57 (1968).
352. See Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 580 (1998) (stating a
preference for narrow, as-applied challenges as opposed to the “strong medicine” of facial
invalidation (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973))); accord United States
v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 20–22 (1960); Yazoo & Miss. Valley R.R. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226
U.S. 217, 219–20 (1912).
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challenges to laws, a relative tax on individualized claims and ex ante
challenges to institutional practices.
2. Judicial Interests as a Determinant of the Contours of Fault.
This doctrinal arrangement can be nicely explained by an account
cognizant of the institutional interests of the judiciary. If we assume
that judges’ interests are refracted through an institutional lens, and
thereby focused on managing the federal bench’s workload, current
doctrinal arrangements make surprising sense. To begin with, notice
that caseload pressure can be more effectively relieved by regulating
the broad river of ex post remedial demands rather than by
staunching the comparatively small number of anticipatory requests
for relief. Ex post remedies tends to be discrete rather than aggregate
in nature, and hence more numerous. Different acts of police
misconduct, different trial errors by prosecutors, and different judicial
errors each require distinct suppression hearings, habeas petitions,
and damages awards to determine facts and allocate relief. These
accumulate, imposing a rising toll on judicial-economy ambitions. A
fault rule that plays a gatekeeping function (such as qualified
immunity or § 2254(d)(1)) substitutes simple, mechanical protocols at
the pretrial stage for complex, fact-intensive inquiries at trial. This has
the effect of reducing trial costs, not to mention expenditures on the
remedies portion of litigation. Even if a fault rule does not reduce the
volume of these cases, it does render their adjudication less costly. It
is far easier to determine whether there has been a clear and
unambiguous violation of a constitutional rule than to determine
whether there has been any constitutional violation. This has the
supplemental benefit of enabling delegation to adjuncts such as staff
353
attorneys and law clerks, thus easing the labor of adjudication.
Similarly, the distinction between challenges to laws (such as
Susan B. Anthony List) and challenges to institutional practices (such
as Lyons) reflects the same concern about the managerial costs of
354
different remedies. A challenge to an institutional practice may
require a remedy that involves ongoing supervision and judicial
involvement, whereas a challenge to a legal text can be resolved by

353. By contrast, other methods of mitigating case load burdens, such as “more detailed
pleading and supporting affidavits,” Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 183, at 1821, might have the
effect of sorting for nonfrivolous cases, but only by raising per capita decision costs.
354. Bray, supra note 91, at 1146 n.247 (noting that Lyons can be explained by the
“emphatically managerial injunction” sought in that case).
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the fiat of a judicial order. By making the former easier to obtain than
355
the latter, the Court eases the demand for judicial resources.
This simple account can be supplemented by considering the
356
bench’s institutional interest in public reputation. A judicial interest
in prestige explains both the extent of the fault rule, and its
exceptions. Federal judges have long expressed their belief that
357
“federal courts” are “‘too important’ for certain kinds of cases.”
“Petty” cases are repudiated by leading jurists as ill-suited to federal
358
adjudication. Doctrine and judicial lobbying affirms this belief. For
example, the Court developed through common-law adjudication an
“appellate review” model of administrative agency oversight as a
means to avoid being called upon to decide “matters that were not
359
properly judicial but were rather ‘administrative’ in nature.” In
effect, the appellate review model mitigated caseload demands
created by the new federal regulatory state.
Federal judges also preserve their prestige by preventing
inflation of the federal bench. Seventy-five years after it refined the
appellate review model, the federal judiciary has been among the
most important lobbies in Congress resisting the extension of the
360
prestigious Article III badge to bankruptcy judges, while at the

355. Can these doctrinal distinctions also be explained in ideological terms? It is not
implausible to think that challenges to laws have a different ideological valence to challenges to
institutional practices. It suffices here to observe that doctrine advances both ideological and
institutional interests, and it may be misleading and unnecessary to choose between the two.
356. See LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM LANDES & RICHARD POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF
FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE 43, 48
(2013) (positing “the desire for a good reputation” as part of the judicial utility function).
357. Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of
Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 972 (2000) (tracing back arguments of this kind to Chief
Justice Taft).
358. Felix Frankfurter & Thomas G. Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional
Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 HARV. L. REV. 917, 980–82 (1926) (arguing that the Constitution
does not require Article III judges or juries to determine “petty” criminal cases); see also
Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 456–57 (1893) (invalidating jurisdiction
that required courts to engage in “administrative” rather than judicial functions).
359. Thomas W. Merrill, Article III, Agency Adjudication, and the Origins of the Appellate
Review Model of Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 939, 944, 990 (2011) (describing the
federal judiciary’s “fear of contamination” by involvement in administration).
360. DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN
AMERICA 157–58 (2001) (documenting longer patterns of judicial resistance); Geraldine Mund,
Appointed or Anointed: Judges, Congress, and the Passage of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 Part
Three: On the Hill, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 341, 346 n.18, 347–53 (2007) (describing various
channels of influence from Chief Justice Burger and the federal judiciary into the drafting of the
1978 bankruptcy legislation, including formal testimony and backstage lobbying).
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same time (without discernable irony) invalidating the latter’s review
361
of state-law tort claims. This interest in preserving institutional
prestige aligns with judges’ interest in managing caseloads. Courts do
not maximize their prestige by simply extending their dockets as far
as possible. To the contrary, there is an inverse relationship between
docket pressures and prestige. A bench with fewer, more interesting
cases is, all else being equal, a more alluring and prestigious sinecure
than one with a greater number of less interesting, more mundane
cases. Efforts to insulate federal courts from the messy, unrewarding
labor of adjudicating discrete, dispersed, and unglamorous
constitutional violations result in more judicial time being available
for more prestigious work. They are also consonant with a priority for
high-profile challenges to laws—all the best to reinforce the
impression that federal courts are (or wish to be) high-minded forums
of principle, not mere fact-grubbers sorting through the detritus of
the modern regulatory and police state. Cases such as Susan B.
Anthony List and McCullen are exemplars of a species of prestigious,
high-profile suits that are elicited by leaving unregulated the channels
for injunctive or declaratory relief. The continued supply of these
cases creates the impression of a Court diligent in its enforcement of
the Constitution, even though the Court is spared the hard labor of
vindicating most “petty” constitutional claims that arise from
quotidian crime control and bureaucratic behavior. Hence, the
argument from judicial economy developed here can also be
understood in terms of the reputational interests of the federal courts.
***
This Part has developed evidence to the effect that the
institutional interests of the judiciary have shaped the emergence of
the fault role. I have not tried to show that such interests are exclusive
of other concerns. Rather, I have explored the inadequacy of political
and ideological explanations, and then developed the case for
attributing some causal effect to the judiciary’s institutional interest in
case management. The net effect is to supply a more nuanced account
of doctrinal change than the mechanically ideological stories that to
date have dominated.

361. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2601 (2011); see generally Anthony J. Casey & Aziz
Z. Huq, The Article III Problem in Bankruptcy, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2496468 [http://perma.cc/T2XG-EXRZ]
(describing and criticizing this line of cases).
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III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE FAULT RULE FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES
The primary aim of this Article is to describe how scarce judicial
resources are allocated to the task of constitutional remedies, and to
offer a hypothesis about one set of causal forces that to date have
been largely ignored. This Part turns from that descriptive and
analytic task to some normative implications of the causal claim
advanced here. To be clear, the causal linkage between judicial
independence and remedial rationing that I have proposed in Parts I
and II raises a host of important puzzles. My aim here is not to
resolve all of those questions, but rather to flag what strike me as the
most important of them. Hence, I set forth some of the welfarist and
distributive implications of fault-based rationing of remedial
resources first, and then conclude by limning the consequences of the
present analysis for standard accounts of the Separation of Powers.
A. Distributive Implications
The descriptive account offered in Parts I and II of this Article
has illumined a doctrinal superstructure that imposes low transaction
costs upon ex ante challenges to the verbal content of laws or
regulation, and high transaction costs on both challenges to
institutional practices, and also discrete requests for granular afterthe-fact remedies. The former, therefore, are prioritized over the
latter. This resulting system of implicit taxes and subsidies on private
behavior has complex welfarist and distributional implications.
Characterization of these effects depends on how one defines social
welfare—which is controversial—and whether one thinks
distributional concerns are salient—which is also divisive. Rather
than trying to answer these deep underlying questions, my aim here is
to sketch briefly how constitutional remedies doctrine influences
valuable social ends without trying to define conclusively what those
goals should be. I focus on three vectors of welfare and distributional
effects from the doctrinal arrangements mapped in this Article that
run through, respectively, different sorts of constitutional errors,
different rights, and different litigants. My aim here is not to
pronounce judgments on those effects, but simply to elucidate their
operation.
First, the Court’s remedial doctrine entails that different kinds of
constitutional errors receive different treatment. On the one hand, a
constitutional flaw that is manifest on the face of a generally
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applicable statute or regulation, that operates directly against
individuals as a primary rule without the intermediation of any
prosecutorial discretion on the part of an enforcing agency, is most
vulnerable to judicial correction. At the other end of the spectrum, a
constitutionally flawed act or practice, unmemorialized in written text
and dispersed through time and space in a sporadic, even stochastic,
distribution, cannot be remedied ex ante. Instead, it will receive only
the light review that can be exercised under the anesthetizing regime
of the gross fault rule that covers ex post remedies. Stated otherwise,
errors that occur during the liquidation of standards (which generally
occurs after a violation) receive lighter judicial scrutiny than errors
embedded in the formulation of a rule (which typically occurs before
362
the violation). The doctrine hence creates a subtle tilt in favor of
standards rather than rules where a risk of constitutional challenge is
present.
Second, variation in the transaction costs of different remedies
influences the distribution of resources available for the enforcement
of distinct rights. The fault rule raises the cost of enforcement where
it applies because it demands a more onerous showing by litigants.
This differential in enforcement costs intersects with differences
between rights. Some rights are easier to enforce ex ante with an
injunction, while others are easier to enforce ex post by damages,
suppression, or the vacatur of a conviction. Lowering the price of ex
ante enforcement thus favors some rights over others. To pick an
uncontroversial example, First Amendment and Due Process rights
363
related to participation in the democratic process are most valuable
when enforced prospectively, and lack obvious commensurable
monetary substitutes. After an election has been resolved, and one
candidate is selected over others, there may be no good way to
364
mitigate fully infringements on democratic participation rights.

362. For an analysis of the rules/standard distinction that underscores its temporal element,
see Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 562
(1992).
363. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972) (“In decision after decision, this
Court has made clear that a citizen has a constitutionally protected right to participate in
elections on an equal basis with other citizens in the jurisdiction.”); see also Burdick v. Takushi,
504 U.S. 428, 433–34 (1992); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972).
364. The analysis of aggregate voting rights (such as the rights of a particular ethnic or racial
voting bloc) implicate a more complicated choice of temporal frame. See Adam B. Cox, The
Temporal Dimension of Voting Rights, 93 VA. L. REV. 361, 372–73 (2007). Damages are
sometimes awarded. See, e.g., Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540 (1927).
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Monetary damages would strike many as “hopelessly inadequate.”
Discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause can also be
understood as the failure to treat members of a protected class “with
366
dignity and respect.” Again, compensatory remedies seem poorly
fitted to the particular harm of being treated as less than human.
Dignity is not typically thought to be fungible with cash.
On the other hand, there are many other rights that want for any
prophylactic remedy, but are arguably addressed in a tolerable
fashion via damages after the fact. In the takings context, for
example, the Court has stated that a property owner must pursue
compensation through state procedures before a Fifth Amendment
takings claim will “ripen” for the purposes of federal-court
367
adjudication, and has declined to permit any acceleration of takings
claims even when the process of state-court adjudication generated
368
preclusive effects that barred federal-court relitigation. This reflects
a (perhaps erroneous) belief that ex post remedies are at least
adequate for unconstitutional takings. Even in the absence of formal
constraints on ex ante remedies, moreover, practical and epistemic
constraints may also render ex post claims the only viable pathway.
Illegal searches that generate no inculpatory evidence, for example,
may not be predictable before the fact. Indeed, even in jurisdictions
where unconstitutional searches and police violence are endemic,
Lyons means the ex post channels of tort actions, suppression
motions, and postconviction relief are the only game in town. It is this
class of rights better suited to ex post enforcement that are
disincentivized by the fault rule.
Finally, differences in remedial access will also differentiate
between distinct categories of litigants, both on the plaintiff and on
the state defendant side. Constitutional-rights claimants are likely
sensitive to the costs of judicial enforcement. Litigants’ epistemic and
litigation resources influence the relative costs of different species of
judicial remedy. An increase in the evidentiary showing or procedural

365. Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779,
785–90 (1994) (developing a more general account of incommensurability problems in the law).
366. Id. at 847–51 (discussing sex discrimination claims).
367. Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 194 (1985).
368. San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 338 (2005). The net
effect of Hamilton Bank and San Remo Hotel is not to deprive litigants of a federal forum;
rather, it is to leave the Supreme Court’s certiorari jurisdiction as the sole federal forum for
certain takings claimants. Thomas W. Merrill, The Character of the Governmental Action, 36 VT.
L. REV. 649, 656 (2012).
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hurdles necessary to secure monetary relief, for example, will
therefore reduce expressed demand for that form of judicial
enforcement. The expected value of injunctive relief will vary, by
contrast, depending on the litigant’s ability to anticipate and file suit
prior to a governmental action. Along either margin, litigants’
369
demand for constitutional remedies is likely to be elastic. Changes
in the relative prices of remedies will thus change the pool of litigants
seeking remedies.
Consider, for example, the Court’s use of the fault rule to
increase the cost of enforcing rights ex post relative to ex ante
enforcement in many domains. In expectation, such a change will
depress litigant demand for rights that can only be vindicated through
monetary damages. At the same time, it will increase litigant demand
in respect to rights that can only be vindicated fully by anticipatory
intervention. It also lowers the cost of constitutional remediation for
plaintiffs who have the epistemic and social resources to judicial
assistance before a violation occurs, and increases the cost of such
remediation for plaintiffs who lack the resources to act before the
state does. Whether one looks at different effects between rights or
litigants, therefore the result is the same: some litigants gain, while
others lose out. Changes to the relative transaction costs of different
remedies is thus a way for judges to change the mix of litigants that
benefit from the expenditure of a fixed pool of taxpayer-supported
370
judicial resources. Recalibrating remedies doctrine, in public choice
terminology, is a vehicle for implicitly shifting the allocation of
judicial resources between different interest groups.
Finally, it is not only rights claimants who are treated differently
under the current remedial dispensation. The doctrine also
distinguishes between different state defendants. The current
remedial architecture channels judicial resources toward the scrutiny
of centralized fonts of legal authority (such as legislators or
369. Cf. Francis E. McGovern, An Analysis of Mass Torts for Judges, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1821,
1845 (1995) (“[A] tort is elastic to the extent that the number of cases that are filed (demand)
rises as the transaction costs associated with each case (price) are reduced and the number of
judicial case resolutions increases (supply).”). Demand for judicial enforcement of some
individual rights may be inelastic, such that increases in the price of judicial enforcement has no
effect on the volume of litigation.
370. The quantity of resources allocated to the judicial budget, of course, can vary from year
to year, although in recently years the federal judiciary’s budget has been in decline. See CHIEF
JUSTICE JOHN ROBERTS, 2013 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 4–5 (2013),
http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2013year-endreport.pdf [http://perma.cc/
996U-3UHR] (describing a 5 percent reduction in the annual federal judicial budget).
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regulation-generating agencies), and away from dispersed, discretionexercising officials (such as line officials within dispersed
371
bureaucracies, prosecutors and the police ). Consistent with the
decentralizing impulse at the core of American federalism, the
remedial doctrine described here makes it easier to challenge to
concentrated, top-down forms of lawmaking, and at the same time
raises the price of challenges to dispersed, localized exercises of
delegated authority. This result is particularly striking in the policing
context. Recent ethnographies of urban policing have underscored
the frequency and severity of routine violence inflicted by line
372
officers, in particular in African American communities. It is
precisely the lowest visible forms of unconstitutional violence, which
effect many of the least politically powerful communities in the
United States, that the Court has rendered most difficult to remedy.
This is consistent with Richard Posner, William Landes, and Lee
Epstein’s prediction that reduced access to federal courts “weighs
most heavily on persons seeking to expand legal rights [such as]
373
antidiscrimination rights [and] prisoners rights.”
Reasonable people will differ about whether these effects on
different species of violations, different rights, and different litigants
are warranted or lamentable, just as they disagree on how to
prioritize between rights and litigants. I do not aim to settle those
differences here. Nevertheless, this analysis should underscore the
fact that the fault-based gatekeeping regime for allocating
constitutional remedies, along with its doctrinal adjuncts, has
significant downstream effects on important social goals—effects that
are perhaps all the more surprising given the heterogeneous
ideological composition of judicial coalitions responsible for that rule.
The subtle way in which these effects arise means that they have
never been subject to public scrutiny or debate. At a minimum,
differences in ultimate normative priors should not undermine the
conclusion that such sub rosa redistribution of the benefits that flow
from our Constitution may be problematic simply because of its want
of transparency.

371. See William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV.
780, 799 n.104 (2006) (stating that Lyons “effectively barred injunctions as a remedy for police
misconduct”).
372. See GOFFMAN, supra note 5, at 71–72 (exploring effects of pervasive police violence on
public attitudes and behavior).
373. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 356, at 41.
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B. Implications for the Separation of Powers
A second implication of this Article’s analysis bears on
Separation of Powers theory. The autonomy of the judiciary has long
been conceived as a central plank of the Constitution’s Separation of
374
Powers. But the existence of a causal connection between judicial
independence and a fault-based rule for limiting the availability of
constitutional relief complicates the traditional account of the
judiciary’s role in the national government. At a minimum, it shows
that the policy effects of judicial independence are more volatile than
generally believed. Read more aggressively, the evidence presented
here suggests that the successful institutionalization of judicial
independence can undermine, as much as further, the project of
realizing constitutional rights.
There is a deep-seated belief in American constitutional
jurisprudence of a causal connection between the creation of judicial
independence and the vindication of individual rights. The French
political theorist Montesquieu, an influential figure among the
Framers, cautioned that “liberty” would be lost “if the power of
judging is not separate from the legislative power and from executive
375
power.” Introducing the Bill of Rights to the first Congress, James
Madison prophesized that “independent tribunals of justice” would
act “in a peculiar manner [as] the guardians of those rights” and “an
impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the
376
Legislative or Executive.” On this view, the purpose of judicial
independence is to ensure that cases—especially those involving
prized, basic rights—are decided on their legal merits (however
377
defined) rather than on considerations of naked political power.
Echoes of Madison’s confidence in the social value of judicial
independence resound repeatedly today. For example, Judge Deanall
374. Among “Madison and Hamilton at least, judicial independence was an essential aspect
of the separation of powers.” Stephen B. Burbank, The Architecture of Judicial Independence,
72 S. CAL. L. REV. 315, 320 (1999); see also JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS
AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 299 (1996) (noting that the Framers had “a
substantive conception of the judiciary as the third branch of government”).
375. 2 MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 157 (Cambridge ed. 1989) (1748) (“Nor is
there liberty if the power of judging is not separate from the legislative power and from
executive power . . . . If it were joined to executive power, the judge could have the force of an
oppressor.”); see also M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
96–97 (Liberty Fund 2d ed. 1998) (1967) (placing Montesquieu’s argument in context).
376. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 457 (1789).
377. John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary:
Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 972 (2002).
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Tacha, while serving on the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals,
channeled conventional wisdom in pronouncing that “the
independent federal judiciary has been a powerful tool in guarding
378
the Constitution and the rights of individuals.” Similarly, Solicitor
General Archibald Cox hardly invited controversy when he called
“[a]n independent judiciary . . . the best guarantee of liberty and
impartial justice against executive oppression and other executive or
379
bureaucratic abuse.”
The causal connection between judicial
independence and the vindication of constitutional rights, in short, is,
for all intents and purposes, conventional wisdom today.
The analysis developed in this Article suggests that conventional
wisdom demands caveats. The institutionalization of judicial
independence does not lead inexorably to the vindication of
individual constitutional rights. Rather, the effects of endowing the
federal courts with policy autonomy are contingent upon the interests
and preferences of judges qua institutional actors. When judges’
interests conduce away from the vindication of individual liberty
interests, judicial independence will promote less, not more, respect
for those rights. At least in the contemporary context, the
institutional interests of federal judges have systematically pressed
toward a constriction of remedial generosity. The result has been the
380
transubstantive migration of the fault rule described in Part I.
Separation of Powers theory concerning the judiciary from the
Federalist 78 onward has focused on the negative proposition that
judicial independence, and therefore the vindication of individual
381
rights, simply requires that the courts by free of political influence.
At least at the time of the Philadelphia Convention, this causal claim
rested on theoretical premises rather than on experiential
foundations. “[T]he division of executive and judicial power into two
separate branches of government was a relative novelty in political

378. Deanell Reece Tacha, Independence of the Judiciary for the Third Century, 46 MERCER
L. REV. 645, 645 (1995).
379. Archibald Cox, The Independence of the Judiciary: History and Purposes, 21 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 565, 571 (1996).
380. The claim advanced here is distinct from the assertion that judges have class-based
interests. See Louis Michael Seidman, Ambivalence and Accountability, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1571,
1581 (1988) (arguing that “independent judges are quite capable of confusing the public good
with narrow ideological or class-based concerns”). I am concerned here with institutional, not
ideological, motives.
381. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 522 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)
(emphasizing the judiciary’s lack of dependence).
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theory.” Indeed, at least one element of the salient historical
experience—the vigorous deployment of the habeas corpus writ by
the King’s Bench in England at the beginning of the seventeenth
century—suggested that it was feasible to have robust judicial
oversight of liberty-infringing governmental powers without the
383
formal accouterments of judicial independence. Notwithstanding
this experience, Separation of Powers theory assumes that the
requirement of judicial as well as executive and legislative
involvement in state-sponsored liberty deprivations will serve as a
384
brake on the overzealous use of coercive power.
But this is not necessarily so because of the self-defeating effects
of institutionalizing judicial power. On the one hand, elected officials
may have strong preferences for liberty that might be imposed on
other, more recalcitrant state actors. Federal politicians, for example,
sought to use federal courts to expand liberties in the teeth of state
385
officials’ opposition. The presence of multiple centers of political
power, therefore, introduces the possibility that political control over
the judiciary might lead to more libertarian outcomes. On the other
hand, if judges’ and rights holders’ preferences slip out of alignment,
judges may fail to pursue libertarian ends, or may pursue them with
suboptimal lethargy. Separation of Powers theory, while expressing
concern about political-branch capture of the judiciary, supplies no
mechanism through which the judiciary’s interests would become
386
aligned with those of constitutional-rights holders. There is also no a
priori reason to think that the preferences of those on the federal
bench will accord with the maximal protection of individual rights.
Certainly, the mere absence of overt and ongoing political control
cannot easily be equated with a vigorous passion for liberty. The case
382. Ann Woolhandler, Judicial Deference to Administrative Action—A Revisionist History,
43 ADMIN. L. REV. 197, 214 (1991); see also GORDON WOOD, CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC 1777–1787, at 159–61 (1998) (discussing revolutionary-era difficulties “fit[ting] the
judiciary into the scheme of government”).
383. In the early 1600s, members of the King’s Bench exercised a vigorous oversight of
monarchical authority that became a paradigmatic model for later advocates of the Great Writ.
PAUL HALLIDAY, HABEAS CORPUS FROM ENGLAND TO EMPIRE 64–84 (2010).
384. For elegant modern restatements of this claim, see Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of
Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 1017 (2006); Rebecca L. Brown, Separated
Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1536–38, 1537 n.102 (1991).
385. See KEVIN MCMAHON, RECONSIDERING ROOSEVELT ON RACE 138, 150–75 (2004).
386. Note that the interests of different rights holders might conflict. See, e.g., Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (resolving potential conflict between
reproductive rights and religious liberty). There are many other examples. These show how
hard it is to create an institution that protect the rights of all simultaneously.
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for tethering judicial independence to liberty becomes even more
complicated when the Article II process of judicial selection is
examined. For nothing in either the nomination-and-confirmation
process or the institutional setting of a court leads inexorably to a
387
rights-related mission. Moreover, it is hard to view the Court’s
history dispassionately and see a consistent and uniform commitment
to all constitutional rights.
It gets worse: The historical and theoretical arguments developed
here suggest that the more successful the courts are at building up
their institutional autonomy, the more likely they may be to have
distinct corporate interests that are at odds with the interests of
constitutional-rights holders. That is, the very conditions that produce
institutional stability for courts undermine the incentives necessary
for judicial vigor in pursuit of individual liberty interests. Given this
trade-off between institutional capacity and institutional incentives, it
seems reasonable to hesitate before assuming that the courts will
always and necessarily act in accord with stable libertarian
preferences.
My analysis of the connection between judicial independence in
its contemporary institutional form and the titration of constitutional
remedies suggests that in the contest between institutional interests
and concern for individual liberties, the latter has lost out as a
historical matter. From the institutional perspective of federal courts,
the constant stream of complaints thrown up by defective state courts,
deficient police departments, and errant bureaucracies are a “petty”
388
nuisance.
The fault-based gatekeeping rule installed in the
constitutional tort, habeas, and exclusionary rule contexts
dramatically cuts down on the quanta of resources courts must
allocate to these nuances. At the same time, it still leaves courts free
to deal with more prestigious and higher profile facial challenges to
laws that seek injunctive or declaratory relief.
Contemporary experience, in summary, suggests that when
federal courts are allowed both the discretion and the instruments to
follow through on their institutional preferences, the doctrinal results
can be reduced enforcement of constitutional rights. It can also mean
that many constitutional claimants never even obtain an opportunity

387. For an insightful analysis of the political forces that shape the judicial-appointment
process, see David R. Stras, Book Review Essay, Understanding the New Politics of Judicial
Appointments, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1033, 1047–72 (2008).
388. Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 358, at 980.
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to be heard in court, but rather see their claims deflected via
summary pretrial process. This will inevitably lead to cases in which
individual rights claims are deprived of any day in federal court to
vindicate a constitutional right either before or after the fact—all
because of policy judgments taken by the federal courts. In this
fashion, judicial independence in its institutional form can be at war
with the vindication of individual rights.
The result here is consonant with a rich vein of scholarship
expressly skeptical of the Separation of Powers. For example,
Professor Elizabeth Magill has powerfully argued that the ideas of
balance and separation between branches cannot be cashed out
meaningfully because “in the contested cases, there is no principled
way to distinguish between the relevant power” and “no way to
measure the distribution of power among the branches at any point in
time and no method to predict the effect of an institutional
389
arrangement.” Magill’s work trains on the conceptual integrity of
the Separation of Powers and its consequences for the overall
political system, rather than the specific effects of judicial
independence. Complementing Magill’s account, Professors Daryl
Levinson and Richard Pildes have argued that “the degree and kind
of competition between the legislative and executive branches vary
significantly, and may all but disappear, depending on whether the
House, Senate, and presidency are divided or unified by political
390
party.”
Supplementing that literature, this Article suggests that the
effects of judicial independence—another mode of institutional
separation of authorities—are far less constant or salutary than many
have believed. Complementing work that excavates the limited ability
of federal courts to vindicate constitutional rights in the face of
391
political resistance, my excavation of the causal connection between
judicial independence and constitutional remediation suggests that
those who hope to realize the Bill of Rights’ aspirations would do well
not to follow its drafters advice: independent courts are not the

389. M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation of Powers Law, 150
U. PA. L. REV. 603, 604–05 (2001); see also M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in
Separation of Powers Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1127, 1155–57 (2000) (arguing that ideas of balance
or separation provide no determinate answer to institutional design questions).
390. Levinson & Pildes, supra note 31, at 2314.
391. See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991) (analyzing the limits of school desegregation litigation under the
Equal Protection Clause).
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“peculiar . . . guardians” of constitutional rights. Instead, judges may
often be their most implacable foes precisely because of the
judiciary’s institutional interests.
CONCLUSION
The central goal of this Article has been to describe the rise of a
fault-based system for rationing both process and remedies for
constitutional violations, and to hypothesize one cause of that
ascendancy that the literature has ignored. Since the early 1980s, that
regime has diffused from constitutional tort jurisprudence to both the
exclusionary rule and the postconviction habeas contexts. Scholars
have failed to observe or study this doctrinal diffusion, or the
concomitant unification of remedies doctrine across the three most
frequently invoked mechanics for ex post redress for constitutional
rights.
The rise of fault-based rationing, I have hypothesized, is not just
a function of changing judicial ideology. It is also a consequence of an
independent federal judiciary pursuing its interests and preferences
by shaping doctrine. It thus flows, in some nontrivial measure, from
our commitment to judicial independence at the institutional level.
The resulting legal landscape raises many hard questions of how
constitutional rights can, or should, be vindicated. At the very least,
the analysis presented here should call into question any easy or
quick reliance on the courts as the first and last best protectors of
constitutional rights, at least so long as they are free to pursue their
own institutional interests.

